What is NATO’s Agenda 2030

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NATO’s “Agenda 2030” focuses on modernizing its defense and deterrence capabilities to address 21st-century threats, which is separate from the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals. Key NATO goals include enhancing collective defense through new rapid reaction forces and modernized defense plans, investing in emerging technologies, improving resilience, and addressing climate change as a security challenge.

Key “Agenda 2030” goals for NATO

Modernize and strengthen collective defense:
- Develop more comprehensive and detailed defense plans.
- Launch a new, rapidly deployable Allied Reaction Force.
- Increase joint procurement and investment in defense industrial production.
- Integrate new members like Finland and Sweden into alliance plans and structures.
- Conduct more frequent and large-scale training exercises.
Adapt to modern challenges:
- Improve resilience against cyber, space, and hybrid warfare threats.
- Strengthen protection of critical undersea infrastructure.
- Invest in emerging and disruptive technologies.
- Conduct military operations and maintain infrastructure resilience in the face of climate change.
Enhance cooperation and strategic awareness:
- Increase cooperation with partners, including the European Union.
- Improve understanding of adversaries and promote cognitive superiority.
- Foster better cross-domain command and decision-making capabilities.
- Encourage all members to contribute equitably to collective security.

NATO 2030: towards a new strategy

The NATO summit held in Brussels on 14 June was intended to show a return to transatlantic unity after four years of the Trump administration. The new President Joe Biden wanted to demonstrate that the United States is resuming its leadership role in the transatlantic community; that NATO is still an important alliance for the US; and Washington is committed to the principles of Article 5. The Alliance is also adapting to changes in the security environment by adopting the NATO 2030 agenda and deciding to develop a new strategic concept. However, the parameters of this adaptation will be subject to further negotiations between the allies, particularly with regard to strengthening deterrence and defence on the eastern flank, and with regard to how and to what extent the Alliance should engage in containing China. At the same time, as NATO adjusts its course to focus on deterrence and defence, other formats for security cooperation between the US & Europe and among the European countries are being developed.

NATO 2030: what kind of Alliance?

The backdrop to the Brussels summit was the Alliance’s 70^th anniversary meeting in London in December 2019, which showed that the organization was faced with a wide range of problems. In 2019, the debate was dominated by different perceptions of threats and challenges, a lack of political consultation on key issues, debate over the size of defense budgets, and the relationship with Donald Trump, which, from the perspective of the Western European members, was difficult. At that time, the allies decided to initiate a reflection process under the leadership of the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg; he set up a group of experts who issued a report entitled United for a New Era in November 2020. Taking the report’s proposals as well as his own conclusions into consideration, and after consultation with the member states, Stoltenberg presented his proposals for the NATO 2030 agenda, which the allies accepted during the Brussels summit. This document will most likely set the direction for a new NATO Strategic Concept, to be adopted in 2022, that will replace the now outdated 2010 strategy.

The starting point of the NATO 2030 agenda is the belief that the Alliance is once again at a turning point in its history where it must adapt to a changing world – not only to confront Russia’s continued aggressive policy, but also to find answers to the challenges posed by the rise of China. The allies thus agreed that they should first of all intensify their political consultations. NATO is to become a platform for extended political dialogue. In strategic terms, the organization is primarily betting on deterrence and defense. In view of the growing uncertainty in international relations, the allies agreed to fulfill the financial commitments made in 2014 to spend 2% of their GDP on defense and 20% of their annual defense budgets on new arms and military equipment. NATO will also ideally refrain from conducting any major crisis response operations during the current decade. This is symbolized by the planned withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan and the end of the largest out-of-area ‘Resolute Support’ operation, following the US decision to withdraw its troops from that country. However, NATO will continue to engage in training and capacity building in partner countries in the wider European neighborhood.

NATO wants to play a larger role in improving the resilience of its member states by investing in emerging and disruptive defense technologies, adapting to climate change, and upholding the rules-based international order. On the first of these issues, in 2016 the allies decided to adopt seven baseline requirements for national resilience with regard to the following areas: continuity of government and critical government services; the ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movements of people; the ability to deal with mass casualties; ensuring the resilience of energy supplies; of food and water resources; of civil communications systems; and of transport systems. At the Brussels summit they made a strengthened commitment to resilience, extending the areas above to include the diversification of supply chains, as well as the resilience of critical infrastructure (on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace) and key industries.The development of emerging and disruptive technologies is to be facilitated by the planned creation of a civil-military Defense Innovation Accelerator (DIANA) and a multinationally-funded NATO Innovation Fund to invest in start-ups working on dual-use and emerging & disruptive technologies. NATO wants to invest in the following areas: artificial intelligence, data and computing, autonomy, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology and human enhancements, hypersonic technologies, and space. The allies have also adopted a Climate Change and Security Action Plan. NATO wants to analyze the impact of climate change on the security environment, and on allied installations, missions and operations; adapt accordingly, and contribute to the mitigation of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the military.

Russia, the eastern flank and collective defence

As NATO has agreed that Russian aggressive actions remain the most important threat to Euro-Atlantic security; they are extensively discussed in the Brussels Summit Communiqué. At the same time, the Alliance has highlighted its traditional dual-track approach towards Russia, consisting of both deterrence & defence and maintaining dialogue. Since 2014 NATO has aimed to deter Moscow from taking hostile actions against its member states and to strengthen its own ability to collectively defend endangered allies, in parallel to the US’s military activity. After 2014 the Alliance suspended practical civilian and military cooperation with Moscow, but declared itself open to political dialogue within the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). In recent years the NRC meetings have taken place only sporadically due to a lack of interest and goodwill on the Kremlin’s part. Nowadays NATO is sending signals that it wishes to reactivate the dialogue in the NRC after a hiatus of more than a year and a half. This is also linked to the Biden administration’s agenda aimed at stabilising relations with Russia and making them more predictable. This means that arms control may assume greater prominence as a topic in NATO.

The Brussels summit underlined that collective defence remains the Alliance’s main mission. NATO will maintain its current strategy of maintaining a limited military presence in the Baltic Sea (four battlegroups in Poland and the Baltic states, strengthened air policing) and the Black Sea region (periodic rotations of land forces and strengthened air policing), combined with improved reinforcement of these forces in times of crisis or conflict. These measures include: a reform of the NATO Response Force; increasing the readiness of national armed forces; creating new and adapting existing NATO headquarters to collective defence needs; expanding multinational headquarters at the corps and division levels on the eastern flank; improving military mobility; conducting rapid reinforcement exercises; and enhancing the ability to secure sea lanes of communication between America and Europe.

New elements with regard to deterrence and defence were also put forward at the Brussels summit. NATO will implement the classified military strategy adopted in 2019 and the two military concepts based on it: the deterrence and defence concept, and the warfighting concept. It also intends to develop strategic, domain-specific and regional military plans, so it can respond more quickly to any contingencies. The member states have also agreed to strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure, i.e. the national or multinational military headquarters to be made available for the Alliance, and to continue work on the fuel supply distribution (implicitly on the eastern flank), although in both cases no further details were forthcoming. In 2022, a decision will be taken on increasing common funding; this is an important issue from the perspective of the eastern flank, as the NATO Security Investment Programme co-finances the development of military infrastructure in the region. Before the summit, Stoltenberg also proposed that the common funding could partially cover the allied military presence and exercises on the eastern flank. Due to opposition from France, this issue has not yet been finalised, and will be subject to further negotiations. In terms of collective defence, the message from NATO on hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and attacks to, from or within space is clear – on a case-by-case basis, they could lead to the invocation of Article 5.

The emphasis on collective defence, together with the continuation and improvement of the deterrence and defence posture, is good news for the eastern flank. However, the greatest challenge in the years to come will lie in the European allies maintaining adequate defence spending and fulfilling their commitments to enhance their conventional military capabilities. Their increased involvement in deterrence and defence efforts in NATO will be all the more important as the US becomes more militarily engaged in the Asia-Pacific region.

NATO and China

For several years, the Alliance has been discussing whether and how to address the threats and challenges to international security posed by China. At the 2019 London summit, NATO recognized that “China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance”. This formulation represented a compromise between Washington, which is interested in greater NATO involvement in containing Beijing’s influence globally, and Paris & Berlin, which do not want to take the US strategy towards China into the Euro-Atlantic organizations. However, NATO cannot ignore the political, economic, and military rise of China and its implications for European, transatlantic and international security, as well as Russian-Chinese cooperation against the West. Nor can it disregard the US’s perception of these threats, as this could lead to the gradual marginalization of NATO in Washington’s eyes.

At the Brussels summit, the Allies took a measured approach towards Beijing, although they toughened their earlier stance: “China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance”. According to NATO, China’s ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order. The Brussels Summit Communiqué mentions China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal, its opacity in military modernization, and its military-civil fusion strategy. On this basis, new Chinese civilian innovations serve both economic and military development, with the goal of making the People’s Liberation Army a world-class armed force by 2049. It seems that as in the case of Russia, NATO intends to develop a dual-track approach in its relations with China. However, NATO policy towards Beijing will be based on different elements than its strategy towards Moscow.

There will be no direct military engagement by NATO in the Asia-Pacific aimed at counteracting China’s aggressive actions towards its neighbours. The Brussels Summit Communiqué does not even mention the freedom of navigation operations conducted in the South China Sea by several allies outside the NATO framework. There is, however, a consensus among the member states for greater engagement in political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners like Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region to “promote cooperative security and support the rules-based international order”. The Alliance primarily wants to focus on reducing malign Chinese influence in Europe by strengthening resilience in critical and transport infrastructure, telecommunications, supply chains and information policy. NATO’s message on hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and attacks to, from or within space that could invoke Article 5 seems to apply not only to Russia, but also to China. Moreover, the NATO 2030 agenda’s emphasis on investing in emerging and disruptive technologies is also aimed at Beijing. The second pillar of the Alliance’s policy towards China is to be the offer of dialogue. Climate change is mentioned as a common challenge, but NATO will primarily be interested in confidence-building and transparency measures regarding China’s military potential, nuclear capabilities and doctrine.

The discussion on NATO’s strategy on China is not over yet. It is to be expected that the Alliance will adapt its policy towards Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness, as it has been doing in the case of Russia in recent years. However, further steps will depend on the policies of the major European allies, mainly France and Germany. In the current decade, Russia will remain the greatest direct threat to the Alliance.

European security: NATO, the US, the EU and coalitions of the willing

NATO’s adaptation is taking place in an increasingly complex European and transatlantic security environment, in which the Alliance remains responsible for collective defence in Europe, complemented by the US’s parallel military posture. At the same time, other formats of cooperation between the US & Europe and among European states related to broader security policy issues are being developed.

The dialogue between the United States and the European Union on economic, trade, climate and security policy, in which the current US administration has decided to engage in, is becoming increasingly important. The US-EU summit took place the day after the NATO leaders’ meeting in Brussels. It is within the US-EU dialogue, and to a lesser extent within the Alliance itself, that the consultations on key issues related to China in the technological and economic areas will take place. Moreover, the high-level US-EU dialogue has been extended to include policy coordination towards Russia. A dedicated dialogue on security and defense has also been established, albeit on a more limited scale than that envisaged by the European Commission in December 2020. The US wants to participate in selected PESCO projects of military cooperation (including on military mobility) and industrial defense cooperation co-financed by the European Defense Fund. Whether US firms will be admitted to the latter depends largely on whether Paris alters its negative stance.

The European Union has been enhancing its activities in security policy since 2016. It is currently working on the so-called Strategic Compass, the first security strategy to be approved in the first half of 2022 during the French presidency of the Council of the EU. The Compass is intended to set goals in four areas: crisis management, capabilities, resilience and partnerships. There are different opinions among the member states as to what kind of an actor in security policy the EU should become. One group, led by France, wants an ambitious policy wherein the EU can conduct large-scale crisis management operations and develop military capabilities & command structures that are autonomous from those of the US and NATO. According to Paris, the EU should also have its own agenda when it comes to strengthening the resilience of its member states and shaping relations with NATO. The transatlantic-oriented member states, for whom the Alliance remains the main organization ensuring security in Europe, are in favor of limiting any politically and militarily ambitious goals deemed as unrealistic. They are also in favor of linking the EU’s support for developing military capabilities more closely with the priorities and processes in NATO. From the perspective of the eastern flank, it is crucial to maximize coordination between the EU and NATO in all the areas mentioned. Whether this will happen, and what goals the EU will set for itself, will depend on the outcome of negotiations between the member states, as well as on how the implementation of the Strategic Compass will actually proceed.

Irrespective of the security policy developments in the EU, there is a trend to build European ‘coalitions of the willing’, mainly under French leadership, to conduct crisis management operations in Europe’s southern neighborhood – with or without partial US military support. Several European countries participate in the French Takuba special task force, which supports the G5 armed forces in combating extremists in the Sahel: Estonia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands and Romania. The French-led EMASOH maritime awareness mission in the Strait of Hormuz involves Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands. Such European coalitions of the willing may be more likely in the future, not least as NATO signals a desire to withdraw from conducting crisis management operations. Such European coalitions of the willing might be formed largely outside the EU, which does not have an appetite for big crisis management operations, but could perhaps also be created within the Union by using the instruments at the EU’s disposal. During the Strategic Compass’s development phase, the invocation of Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union has been one of the topics in the discussions.

Deterrence and defence

NATO is a defensive alliance. Its members are committed to safeguarding the freedom and security of all Allies, against all threats, from all directions. They do this by maintaining a credible deterrence and defence posture based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities. In response to the current security environment, Allies are significantly strengthening the deterrence and defence of the Alliance as the backbone of their Article 5 commitment to defending each other.

The USS Gerald R. Ford sails out of the Oslo Fjord in Norway in May 2023. (Photo: Norwegian Armed Forces)

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. It has shattered peace in Europe and reinforced the need for NATO to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture remains credible and effective.
In response, NATO has undertaken the biggest reinforcement of its collective defence in a generation, significantly increasing the number of forces on its eastern flank and enhancing its ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat.
This reinforcement includes:
- doubling the number of multinational battlegroups on NATO’s eastern flank from four to eight;
- regularly exercising the scaling up of forward land forces beyond the battalion-size battlegroups to brigade-size units, when and where required;
- ensuring that in-place, combat-ready forces are supported by rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control;
- launching “Eastern Sentry”, a military activity that aims to bolster NATO’s posture along its eastern flank;
- creating a new NATO Force Model, which provides a larger pool of available and ready forces, improving NATO’s ability to respond to any scenario, including at very short notice;
- launching a new Allied Reaction Force that can be deployed rapidly to carry out a wide range of missions;
- adopting the most comprehensive and detailed defence plans since the Cold War, improving the coherence of NATO’s collective defence planning with Allies’ national planning;
- approving a rotational model of modern air and missile defence systems and capabilities;
- developing a new policy for improving logistics support to move, reinforce, supply and sustain forces;
- acquiring new and modern equipment, including through joint procurement initiatives and increased investment in defence industrial production;
- integrating Finland and Sweden – NATO’s newest members – and their capabilities into the Alliance’s plans, forces and command structures;
- strengthening the protection of critical undersea infrastructure;
- enhancing NATO’s space, cyber, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence capabilities;
- conducting more frequent and large-scale training and exercises to demonstrate NATO’s ability to defend any Ally that comes under threat;
- increasing cooperation with partners, including the European Union, to strengthen security both within and outside of NATO territory, which makes NATO itself safer.
In support of all these measures, Allies have made considerable progress in increasing defence spending, including investments in major equipment, taking steps towards fairer burden-sharing within NATO. To continue building on this momentum, Allies agreed a new defence investment plan at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, committing to invest 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence by 2035.
NATO’s ongoing adaptation is driven by two key military concepts: the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area focuses on force employment to deter and defend today, while the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept offers a vision to guide the Alliance’s long-term warfare development to remain militarily strong now and in the future.

Key threats to Allied security

NATO faces the most dangerous security environment since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and has gravely undermined global security. Terrorism continues to threaten stability and security across the world. Hostile actions against Allied countries are accelerating, from cyber attacks to critical infrastructure sabotage, assassination attempts and disruptions of civil aviation. These actions are part of a coordinated campaign to destabilise Europe and North America, and weaken the transatlantic Alliance. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said repeatedly, “We are not at war, but we are not at peace either.”

At the same time, the Alliance faces intense global competition. A number of countries are rapidly building up their forces and seeking to reshape the rules-based international order. China is substantially growing its military capabilities, including its nuclear weapons, with no transparency or limitations. The deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, and their increasing defence industrial cooperation with Iran and North Korea, are a cause for profound concern. In this context, NATO Allies are ramping up defence spending and production, so that the Alliance can maintain its competitive edge in current capabilities and future technologies.

Russia

Russia in particular is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security. It seeks to fundamentally reconfigure the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. It is rebuilding and expanding its military capabilities, and continues its airspace violations and provocative activities. It is waging a campaign of aggressive hybrid actions against Allies, including critical infrastructure sabotage, acts of violence, provocations at Allied borders, instrumentalisation of irregular migration, malicious cyber activities, electronic interference, disinformation campaigns and malign political influence, as well as economic coercion. Its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signalling, including its announced stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus, demonstrate a posture of strategic intimidation. The Alliance is determined to constrain and contest Russia’s aggressive actions, and to counter its ability to conduct destabilising activities towards NATO and Allies.

Terrorism

Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO citizens and to international peace and prosperity. In recent years, a number of NATO Allies have experienced terrorist attacks on their territory, many of which were the result of conditions in places beyond their borders. Conflict, fragility and instability in Africa and the Middle East directly affect the security of the Alliance and its partners. NATO’s southern neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions, faces interconnected security, demographic, economic and political challenges that are aggravated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity. NATO will continue to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorists and terrorist organisations based on a combination of prevention, protection and denial measures with determination, resolve and in solidarity with Allies and partners.

NATO’s purpose: safeguarding the freedom and security of its members

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Collective defence is at the heart of the Alliance, as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend Allied territory and populations against attack in a world where peace and security cannot be taken for granted.

Deterrence is a core element of NATO’s overall strategy: preventing conflict and war, protecting Allies, maintaining freedom of decision and action, and upholding the principles and values that the Alliance stands for – individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Free societies and the rules-based international order need to be backed by credible transatlantic defence. NATO’s collective strength deters aggression from potential adversaries.

At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO set a new baseline for its deterrence and defence posture in line with its 360-degree approach, across the land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains, and against all threats and challenges.

NATO Leaders built upon this new baseline at the 2023 Vilnius Summit and 2024 Washington Summit, agreeing significant measures to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence in all domains. In Vilnius, Allies approved a new generation of regional defence plans to strengthen forward defences and increase the Alliance’s ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that may come under threat. In Washington, they pledged to expand their defence industrial capacity to deliver the critical capabilities needed for collective defence.

At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Allies committed to investing 5% of GDP annually on defence by 2035, including at least 3.5% on core defence requirements for Allied militaries and up to 1.5% on defence- and security-related spending. These investments will ensure that Allies maintain NATO’s warfighting readiness for years to come.

NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities. NATO maintains the freedom of action and flexibility to respond to the full spectrum of challenges with an appropriate and tailored approach.

Resilience: the first line of deterrence and defense

Enhancing national and collective resilience is an integral part of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. This means strengthening the capacity of societies to prepare for, respond to, recover from and adapt to the full range of threats and hazards.

Russia’s war against Ukraine, growing geopolitical competition and the many other security challenges faced by the Alliance today underscore the importance of NATO’s “all hazards” and “whole of society” approach to resilience. This means preparing, empowering and investing in the ability of societies to defend themselves against a wide range of threats – from cyber attacks to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents; terrorism; pandemics; natural disasters; and growing strategic threats, including against democratic systems, critical infrastructure, and supply chains. Allies boost their resilience by addressing vulnerabilities that can otherwise be used as leverage or be targeted by adversaries. Resilience is therefore an important aspect of deterrence by denial: persuading an adversary not to attack by convincing it that an attack will not achieve its intended objectives.

Resilience also requires close civil-military cooperation, as it impacts NATO’s ability to conduct its missions and maintain the mobility of troops and equipment. Ensuring that national and military forces under NATO command are adequately supported with civilian resources and infrastructure is a core feature of NATO’s resilience efforts. Since 2014, NATO has been providing guidelines to assist national authorities in improving their resilience across seven baseline requirements by reducing potential vulnerabilities. These requirements are updated regularly to reflect the evolving nature of the challenges faced by the Alliance.

In line with the NATO 2030 agenda and the 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, the 2022 Strategic Concept stresses the importance of adopting a more integrated and better coordinated approach to resilience within the Alliance, including against Russian coercion, and in supporting NATO partners to counter malign interference and aggression. Partnerships with non-NATO countries and other organisations are essential to reinforcing Allies’ national and collective resilience, and to supporting the Alliance’s planning and preparedness through the sharing of information and best practices.

Bolstering NATO’s deterrence and defense since 2014

Throughout its history, NATO has continuously adapted its deterrence and defence to meet the challenges of the evolving security environment. Over the past decade in particular – from Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its increasingly threatening posture towards the Alliance – NATO has overhauled its plans and structures to ensure that Allies are ready to respond to any threat from any direction.

2014 – Readiness Action Plan

The Readiness Action Plan (RAP), launched at the 2014 Wales Summit, was a major driver for change in the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture. The RAP included assurance measures for NATO Allies in Central and Eastern Europe to reassure their populations, deter potential aggression and reinforce their defence. It also included adaptation measures – longer-term changes to NATO’s forces and command structure – which launched the most significant reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the end of the Cold War.

2016 – Strengthened deterrence and defence posture, including enhanced Forward Presence

Building on the RAP, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a strengthened deterrence and defence posture at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. It provided the Alliance with a broad range of options to be able to respond to any threats from wherever they arise to protect NATO territory, populations, airspace and sea lines of communication. Allies agreed to establish an enhanced Forward Presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, and in 2017 four NATO multinational battlegroups were deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Additional measures were taken to reinforce security in the south-east of the Alliance, with a tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region. Furthermore, a number of measures have been undertaken to adapt the Alliance to the challenges emanating from the South, including capacity-building, dedicated exercises and advance planning, as well as setting up the Regional Hub for the South in Naples, Italy, which contributes to NATO’s situational awareness.

2018 – NATO Readiness Initiative

At the 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO Leaders reiterated their resolve to bolster the Alliance’s readiness, responsiveness and reinforcement to respond to threats in a 360-degree approach. A NATO Readiness Initiative was launched to enhance the Alliance’s rapid-response capability, either for reinforcement of Allies in support of deterrence or collective defence, including for high-intensity warfighting, or for rapid military crisis response, if required. It consisted of providing 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, 30 kinetic air squadrons and 30 major naval combatants at 30 days’ readiness or less.

2020 – Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA)

In 2020, Allies approved the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA). The DDA Concept provides a single, coherent framework for NATO Allies to contest, deter and defend against the Alliance’s main threats in a multi-domain environment. It also strengthens the Alliance’s preparedness to address challenges by enhancing NATO’s advance planning for potential crisis and conflict scenarios. Under the DDA Concept’s framework, NATO has developed strategic, domain-specific and regional military plans to improve the Alliance’s ability to respond to any contingencies. These plans are fully coherent with the planning of Allied forces and the new NATO Force Model, and they include posture management, capability development (including training and exercises), and command and control.

2021 – NATO 2030 agenda and NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept

At the 2021 Brussels Summit, Allies agreed the NATO 2030 agenda to strengthen the Alliance further and guide its adaptation for the future. This agenda includes deterrence and defence as a core element of the transatlantic bond between Europe and North America, which is at the heart of the Alliance. Allied Leaders welcomed the significant progress made to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture since 2014, including increased defence spending, modern capabilities, enhanced political and military responsiveness, and higher readiness.

They also welcomed the ongoing implementation of the DDA Concept and approved the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, which provides a long-term vision for maintaining and developing NATO’s decisive military edge, ensuring that the Alliance continuously develops its military and technological advantage as the character of conflict evolves.

2022 – Response to Russia’s war against Ukraine

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, NATO Leaders met in Brussels on 24 March 2022 to address the consequences of Russia’s actions and to take measures to further strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence. They decided to deploy four multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, in addition to those already present in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, effectively doubling the number of battlegroups on NATO’s eastern flank from four to eight. They also decided to step up cyber defences and scale up exercises focused on collective defence and interoperability.

At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO Leaders made decisions to significantly strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture. To that end, Allies agreed to adjust the balance between in-place forces and reinforcement. They agreed that the forward deployed battlegroups on the Alliance’s eastern flank should be able to be scaled up to brigade-size units, where and when required. These in-place forces are underpinned by credible, rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control. Allies also agreed a new NATO Force Model, which strengthens and modernises the NATO Force Structure, supports the Alliance’s core tasks and resources its new generation of military plans. Allies agreed to ensure a substantial and persistent presence on land, at sea and in the air, including through stronger integrated air and missile defence.

2023 – New generation of regional defence plans and Defence Production Action Plan

At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO Leaders agreed to modernise NATO for a new era of collective defence, approving the most comprehensive and detailed defence plans since the Cold War. This new generation of regional defence plans is significantly improving the coherence of NATO’s collective defence planning with Allies’ national planning of their forces, posture, capabilities, and command and control. These plans direct how NATO will deter and defend against any aggressor from any direction, explaining how, in the event of a crisis, Allied forces would defend forward and defeat complex threats across NATO territory. They also set out specifically what will be expected of Allies in a crisis. Driven by the increasingly complex threat environment, this is a larger, more demanding, ask of Allies than NATO has made since the end of the Cold War. The plans ensure that Allies can provide the right forces at the right time and in the right places.

In Vilnius, Allies also agreed a new Defence Production Action Plan to bolster engagement with the defence industry, accelerating joint procurement, boosting production capacity and enhancing Allies’ interoperability.

2024 – NATO Force Model and NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge

At the 2024 Washington Summit, Allies welcomed the progress made since the 2022 Madrid and 2023 Vilnius Summits on reinforcing and modernising NATO for a new era of collective defence.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the defence plans agreed in Vilnius, Allies are implementing the NATO Force Model agreed in Madrid, which delivers a larger pool of dedicated combat-capable forces, harnessing regional expertise and geographic proximity to improve military responsiveness. As part of these efforts, they also established a new multinational and multi-domain Allied Reaction Force in July 2024, which provides more options to respond swiftly to threats and crises in all directions. The NATO Force Model and the Allied Reaction Force have replaced the NATO Response Force (2002-2024) as the framework to organise, manage, activate and command Allied national forces, providing a larger pool of available forces and improving NATO’s ability to respond at very short notice.

In Washington, Allied Leaders also agreed the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge to increase their cooperation with the defence industry and urgently deliver the most critical capabilities, including ammunition and air defence systems. This Pledge builds off the Defence Production Action Plan, which Allies agreed in 2023.

NATO Leaders also agreed at the Washington Summit to strengthen NATO’s command and control, and welcomed ongoing efforts by Allies to increase their presence on NATO’s eastern flank; in July 2024, Latvia became the first country to scale up its NATO forward presence to a brigade, as NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia was stood up with Canada as the framework nation. In addition, Allied Leaders committed to improve NATO’s ability to reinforce and sustain Allied forces across Alliance territory, including through greater logistics coordination and the prepositioning of ammunition and equipment.

2025 – New capability targets and 5% defence investment commitment

At their June 2025 meeting, NATO Defence Ministers agreed a set of new capability targets that outline the forces and capabilities that Allies need to invest in over the coming years, so that NATO can fulfil its tasks, particularly to implement its defence plans in full. They include specific targets for air and missile defence, long-range weapons, logistics, large land manoeuvre formations and much more.

At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Allied Leaders committed to investing 5% of GDP annually on defence by 2035. This 5% commitment includes at least 3.5% on core defence requirements for Allied militaries to meet the NATO capability targets, and up to 1.5% on defence- and security-related spending, for example on critical infrastructure protection. NATO also publicly released an updated Defence Production Action Plan to continue building the Alliance’s defence industrial capacity.

Furthermore, throughout 2025, a number of Allies continued to demonstrate their ability to scale up their presence on NATO’s eastern flank, and Germany inaugurated its permanent multinational brigade in Lithuania.

Strengthening deterrence and defense in specific areas

In addition to the measures listed above, over the past decade NATO has strengthened its deterrence and defence in the following specific areas.

Integrated Air and Missile Defence

NATO Leaders have agreed to improve the readiness, preparedness and interoperability of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) through activities across all domains and along the spectrum of conflict. The Alliance is bolstering the integration and coherence of its IAMD through regular training, and the rotational presence of modern air defence systems and capabilities, with an initial focus on the eastern flank. These efforts will support NATO’s readiness, including its ability to deter aggression and manage escalation risks in a crisis that has a nuclear dimension.

Nuclear deterrence and arms control

NATO continues to address the security implications of Russia’s ongoing modernisation of its nuclear forces, including its large stockpile of theatre-range weapons, and the expansion of its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems, which pose a significant risk to Alliance security. Russia’s violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape. The Alliance is responding by strengthening its advanced conventional capabilities, investing in new platforms – including fifth-generation fighter aircraft – and adapting its exercises, intelligence, and air and missile defence posture. It is doing so while taking all necessary steps to ensure that its nuclear deterrence policy and forces remain credible, effective, safe and secure. At the same time, NATO remains strongly committed to effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and continues to call for all actors, including Russia and China, to engage constructively.

Exercises

Exercises remain an integral part of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, since military training is an essential requirement to maintain the Alliance’s readiness levels and improve interoperability. NATO training and exercises simulate both conventional and nuclear dimensions of a crisis or conflict, facilitating greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture across all domains and the entire spectrum of conflict. Exercises also play an important role in deterrence by communicating NATO’s capability, readiness and resolve to potential adversaries.

Cyberspace

NATO recognises cyberspace as a domain of operations in which it must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, at sea and in space. The creation of a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Belgium in 2018 and the formation of counter-hybrid support teams to assist Allies in need also bolster the Alliance’s deterrence efforts. At the 2021 Brussels Summit, Allies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which supports NATO’s core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture to enhance the Alliance’s resilience in cyberspace. At the 2024 Washington Summit, Allies agreed to establish the NATO Integrated Cyber Defence Centre to enhance network protection, situational awareness and the implementation of cyberspace as an operational domain.

Space

At the December 2019 Leaders’ Meeting in London, NATO declared space as a fifth operational domain (alongside air, land, sea and cyberspace). The information gathered and delivered through satellites is critical for NATO activities, operations and missions, including collective defence, crisis response and counter-terrorism. The NATO Space Operations Centre established in 2020 in Germany serves as a focal point for sharing information, coordinating Allies’ efforts and supporting NATO’s operations and missions. At the 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO recognised that attacks to, from or within space could present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance and could lead to the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 2023, NATO announced plans to establish the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) initiative to enhance space-based surveillance and intelligence for the Alliance, which will improve situational awareness and decision-making. In 2025, Allies adopted the first NATO Commercial Space Strategy, which aims to strengthen the Alliance’s relationship with the commercial space sector and improve NATO’s ability to leverage the growing array of commercial space solutions.

Cooperation with partners

NATO’s adaptation efforts continue in all domains and in areas that cover a whole-of-society approach to defence and security, such as civil preparedness and countering hybrid threats. The Alliance strengthens these activities through increased cooperation with the European Union (EU), which includes complementary and interoperable capability development to avoid duplication and contribute to transatlantic burden-sharing. The Alliance is also cooperating with partners in the Indo-Pacific region to address cross-cutting security issues and global challenges.

Maintaining the Alliance’s military and technological edge

While the Alliance needs to be able to preserve peace today, it also needs to prepare for the increasingly unpredictable security environment of the future. To this end, NATO is undertaking a wide range of measures to maintain its military and technological edge over potential adversaries.

Keeping its technological edge has always been an essential enabler of NATO’s ability to deter and defend against any threat. Innovations in emerging and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems, big data and biotech are changing warfare. That’s why the Alliance is working with public and private sector partners, academia and civil society to develop and adopt new technologies, establish international principles of responsible use, and maintain NATO’s technological edge through innovation. As part of this work, NATO has agreed an implementation strategy for emerging and disruptive technologies. It also established the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the EUR 1 billion NATO Innovation Fund, the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund.

To continue building on these efforts, at the 2025 NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum in The Hague, NATO publicly released a number of new policies to improve the development and procurement of new capabilities. An updated Defence Production Action Plan will help boost the Alliance’s defence industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic. The first NATO Commercial Space Strategy will strengthen NATO’s cooperation with private sector actors in the space sector. The Rapid Adoption Action Plan will accelerate the pace at which Allies develop and integrate new technologies. These actions – alongside increased cooperation with key partners like the European Union, Ukraine and partners in the Indo-Pacific region – will help the Alliance continue to strengthen its industry and technology, and keep its military forces strong.

Investing in defense

At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Allied Leaders committed to investing 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence by 2035. This 5% commitment includes at least 3.5% on core defence requirements for Allied militaries to meet the NATO capability targets, and up to 1.5% on defence- and security-related spending, for example on critical infrastructure and network protection, civil preparedness and resilience, and innovation and defence industrial development. These investments will ensure that Allies have the forces, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, warfighting readiness and resilience needed to deter and defend.

The 5% commitment agreed in 2025 builds off the previous Defence Investment Pledge, adopted by NATO Leaders at the 2014 Wales Summit. The 2014 pledge called for all Allies to stop cuts to defence budgets and move towards the NATO-agreed guideline of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence within a decade. Allies also agreed, in that same timeframe, to move towards spending at least 20% of annual defence expenditure on major equipment and related research and development.

At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, NATO Leaders agreed a renewed Defence Investment Pledge, making an enduring commitment to investing at least 2% of GDP annually in defence and at least 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including defence-related research and development. They also affirmed that in many cases, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.

In 2025, all Allies are expected to meet or exceed the target of investing at least 2% of GDP in defence, compared to only three Allies in 2014. Over the past decade, European Allies and Canada have steadily increased their collective investment in defence – from 1.43% of their combined GDP in 2014, to 2.02% in 2024, when they are investing a combined total of more than USD 485 billion (adjusted to 2021 prices) in defence.

The trajectory and balance of spending under the 5% commitment agreed in 2025 will be reviewed in 2029, in light of the strategic environment and updated NATO capability targets.

Resources

-chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet-nato2030-en.pdf, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”;

–https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2021-06-23/nato-2030-towards-a-new-strategy, “NATO 2030: towards a new strategy.” By Justyna Gotkowska;

–https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm, “Deterrence and defence.”;

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Key threats to Allied security

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Bolstering NATO’s deterrence and defense since 2014

Strengthening deterrence and defense in specific areas

Maintaining the Alliance’s military and technological edge

Investing in defense

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