Henry Kissinger, the Yom Kippur War and the Oil Embargo of 1974

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I have written several articles on postings related to politics. A list of links have been provided at bottom of this article for your convenience. This article will, however address different aspects on these political events.

On October 6, 1973, the Yom Kippur War erupted in the Middle East when Anwar Sadat’s Egypt and Hafez al-Assad’s Syria launched a joint attack on Israel’s southern and northern borders. As the war progressed, Arab states in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) deployed the “oil weapon” against Israel’s allies, imposing an embargo against any nation aiding Israel.

The embargo, lasting from October 1973 to March 1974, targeted Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Rhodesia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It and the broader Yom Kippur War further inflamed Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union while also threatening the global economy.

Before the war’s outbreak, Israel and its Arab neighbors had been at war for twenty-five years. The Arab nations adopted a strict policy against Israel based on the “three no’s”: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel. These policies, along with failed international mediation, made peace impossible.

During the Six-Day War of 1967, Egypt lost the Sinai Peninsula to Israel and Syria forfeited the Golan Heights. Both nations desired to retake these locations.

Egypt and Syria chose the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur to launch their attack against Israel, catching the nation off guard. The Arab nations aimed to recapture key territories and force a settlement through international mediation.

As the war heated up, the United States, under the Nixon administration, found itself in a difficult position. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel had emerged as a critical player in the Middle East, one that the United States could rely on for support. Failure to aid Israel threatened to alienate a key ally, while supporting the young nation would incur the wrath of both the Arab nations and the Soviet Union.

Egypt and Jordan leaned heavily on Soviet support for arms and many Arab nations welcomed Soviet aid. Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sought to play it safe by promising Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir a resupply of weapons only after the war’s end.

The situation changed by October 12. The Soviet Union began flying weapons to Egypt and Syria. Simultaneously, Israeli offensives on both fronts stalled. The Israeli leadership became increasingly despondent and even discussed the use of nuclear weapons. These signals made it clear to the Nixon administration that aid was necessary.

Nixon authorized Operation Nickel Grass to airlift weapons to Israel. A stream of arms entered the nation while the United States made simultaneous covert reconnaissance flights and fed intelligence to Israel. Reinforced Israeli units quickly turned the tide on both the northern and southern fronts. Israeli paratroopers crossed the Suez Canal and pushed toward the outskirts of Damascus by October 15.

The Arab states, sensing failure, employed economic measures to attack Israel. On October 17, Arab oil producers cut oil production by five percent. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, Omar Saqqaf, visited America and warned the Nixon administration that an embargo of sales to the United States was forthcoming. Nixon attempted to assuage Saudi fears, promising to help mediate “peaceful, just, and honorable” outcomes for all parties.

Nixon quickly undercut his own promises two days later when he requested an additional $2 billion worth of arms for Israel from Congress. The request incensed Arab nations, demonstrating to them that Nixon was unlikely to mediate a balanced outcome. The same day, the Arab nations of OPEC instituted an embargo against the United States. The embargo blocked any United States importation of OPEC oil and accompanied further production cuts.

The effect of the oil embargo on the United States was profound. In the early 1970s, the price of industrial commodities was already up, materials were in short supply, and the domestic oil industry suffered from low production capacity. American oil reserves were simply not prepared for a sudden shortfall.

The embargo immediately translated into the “first oil shock” for the American public. The average American faced miles-long lines at the pump and sold-out gas stations. Other sectors of the economy reeled, with everything from tourism to consumer goods suffering increased prices. The already devalued American dollar fell further.

Fears of a global recession worried America and its allies. The Nixon administration had to justify supporting Israel in the face of a global economic downturn. The OPEC nations demanded an “evenhanded” American mediation between Israel and its neighbors to end the embargo.

The linkage between oil and mediation meant that ending the war alone would not end the embargo. Between October 19 and the end of hostilities on October 25, Israel’s armed forces routed the invaders. By October 20, Syria was out of the fight after Israel repulsed it from the Golan Heights. On October 22, a U.N.-sponsored ceasefire collapsed; Israel pressed the attack across the Suez, and by October 24, Israeli forces encircled the Egyptian Third Army.

The Nixon administration realized that the destruction of the Third Army threatened a diplomatic firestorm. The Soviet Union promised intervention if Israel destroyed the army, and Kissinger feared that failing to rein in Israel would leave the United States no means to mediate. Kissinger informed the Israeli ambassador that destroying the Third Army was “an option that does not exist.” Israel refrained from destroying the army, and on October 25, all parties of the conflict signed a ceasefire.

The oil embargo, however, continued and the Nixon administration realized it had to appeal to the Arab nations. Talks from November 1973 to January 1974 among Kissinger, the Arab leaders, and Israel led to the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. The Nixon administration took similar steps with Israel and Syria.

These efforts, along with Kissinger’s decision in mid-March to inform Saudi Arabia that the Nixon administration was prepared to supply new weapons to the kingdom, convinced OPEC to lift the embargo. On March 19, 1974, oil exports to the United States resumed.

The domestic ramifications of the embargo sent ripples across the American energy sector. Nixon launched Project Independence in November 1973, promoting domestic oil exploration and engaging American allies in countering the OPEC cartel. While Nixon’s efforts were insufficient to prevent another crisis during the 1979 oil shock, caused by the Iranian Revolution, strengthening domestic production allowed for a more resilient American economy.

The oil embargo also forced a reexamination of American foreign policy. The United States’ policy towards Israel diminished American power and prestige abroad, particularly by emboldening the Soviet Union. Early Israeli losses made American policymakers realize that Israel was vulnerable. Simultaneously, the willingness of nations like Egypt to pursue negotiations was a welcome surprise.

Taken together, these factors helped convince later administrations that a diplomatic outcome to the Arab-Israeli conflict was not only possible but necessary.

Shuttle Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1975

In January and May 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engaged in “shuttle diplomacy,” a term coined by the members of the media who followed Kissinger on his various short flights among Middle East capitals as he sought to deal with the fallout of the October 1973 war. After three weeks of fighting, a ceasefire found Israeli forces entangled with the Egyptian and Syrian forces. This presented President Richard Nixon and Kissinger with an opportunity to play a lead role in disengaging these armies from one another and possibly laying the groundwork for further steps to peacefully resolve the 25-year conflict. In January 1974, Kissinger helped negotiate the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in eight days, and in May, he arranged a Syrian-Israeli disengagement after a month of intense negotiations. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy secured one last deal in September 1975 with the conclusion of a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

The map of the second disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975. (Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State)

The origins of the first shuttle started with Israel’s proposals for disengagement with the Egyptians on January 4 and 5, 1974. Israel’s proposals demonstrated to Kissinger that the two sides were close enough for him to engage in intensive diplomacy between Jerusalem and Cairo to find a way to negotiate a solution. Nixon, who had become severely distracted by the growing Watergate crisis, encouraged Kissinger to make the trip, but Nixon’s involvement in this negotiation and the ones to follow before his resignation was minimal.

On January 11, Kissinger arrived in Aswan, Egypt where President Anwar Sadat worked during the winter. The negotiations would center around three key items: first, where the forward line of each army would be located; second, the size of the zones where armor was to be limited; and third, the types of armor to be limited in these zones. The Israelis also wanted the Egyptians to reopen the Suez Canal and sought assurances guaranteeing Israeli passage through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran, and Bab el-Madeb. Furthermore, Israel desired Egypt to reconstruct cities along the Suez Canal so as to ensure that the danger to Egyptian civilian populations would deter Egypt from starting another war. Kissinger shuttled between Israel and Egypt for a week, reaching an agreement on January 18. The highlights of the agreement included limited Egyptian and Israeli forces divided by a U.N. buffer zone on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Egypt also agreed to most of the assurances that Israel had requested.

Following the conclusion of this Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, commonly known as Sinai I, U.S. attention moved to Syria, the other country with armies entangled with Israel’s forces. Kissinger hoped moving on the Syrian-Israeli front would lead the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to lift the oil embargo they had imposed on the United States in retaliation for American assistance to Israel during the war.

Unlike the relatively short negotiations that led to the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, negotiations for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement proved far more arduous and took much longer. By March 18, OPEC lifted the oil embargo, but it would be subject to review on June I. With a need to show progress in negotiations between Israel and Syria before then, Kissinger moved forward in laying the groundwork for another shuttle. Through the end of March and most of April, Kissinger met separately in Washington with Israeli officials and a senior- level Syrian emissary to discuss the groundwork for negotiations.

By the end of April, Kissinger decided the time was right to begin his second shuttle in the Middle East. On May 1, he left for Jerusalem to begin nearly a month of intense negotiations between the Israelis and Syrians. The negotiation centered on the town of Quneitra in the Golan Heights, three kilometers within the zone Israel had captured during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Since Quneitra did not include any Israeli settlements, the Syrians wanted the town returned as part of any agreement, as well as the territory taken during the October war. After the first week of negotiations, the Syrians and Israelis had shared with Kissinger their views of a line of disengagement. They were close to one another; however, control of Quneitra and three hills that surrounded the town remained the key stumbling block. By mid-May, both sides had agreed to compromises that put their proposals within a few hundred meters of each other, and Israel had assented to a civilian Syrian presence in Quneitra. Despite the progress, neither side would close the gap needed to complete an agreement. On May 16, Kissinger offered an American proposal that sought to find the common ground necessary to reach a compromise. Both sides wanted modifications to this American proposal, however, and negotiations dragged on for another two weeks with Kissinger almost ceasing the negotiations on three separate occasions. Finally, on May 31, Syria and Israel signed a disengagement agreement.

On August 9, Nixon resigned the presidency, and Vice-President Gerald Ford assumed the office while keeping Kissinger on board as both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. During the fall, much to the U.S. Government’s disappointment, an Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco virtually eliminated any hopes of a Jordanian-Israeli agreement. The Arab representatives announced a resolution on October 28 that recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and affirmed its right “to establish an independent national authority over all liberated territory.” Despite previous Jordanian efforts during the year to engage the Israelis in negotiations over the West Bank and Jerusalem, this resolution forced King Hussein to defer to the PLO in future negotiations with Israel over the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

With Jordan no longer in a position to press the United States for a negotiation with Israel, and Israel unwilling to talk with the PLO, Sadat convinced President Ford and Kissinger that they should spend 1975 pushing for a second agreement between Israel and Egypt over the Sinai. Unlike Sinai I, however, negotiations for this second agreement proved far more challenging and lasted several months. After initial discussions with the Egyptians and Israelis, Ford concluded that the Israelis were not as forthcoming as Egypt, and in March, he called for a reassessment of U.S. policy towards Israel. This sparked an outcry from the U.S. Senate, and Ford backtracked during the early summer. Ultimately, by August, an agreement was within sight, and Kissinger finished the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, known as the Sinai Interim Agreement or Sinai II, which Egypt and Israel signed on September 4. This agreement led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces further east in the Sinai and a U.N. buffer zone put in the place of the Israelis. The agreement also committed major U.S. resources through the establishment of three manned stations and three unmanned electronic sensor fields in the Sinai.

Kissinger denies delaying weapons airlifts to Israel during 1973 Yom Kippur War

Former US diplomat Henry Kissinger denied deliberately delaying airlifts of weapons to replenish Israel’s depleted supplies during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, saying any delay was due to logistical problems and the fact that Washington initially thought Israel was already winning.

Three years after the war, a retired US Navy admiral told the New York Times that Kissinger had deliberately delayed the supply of weapons in Operation Nickel Grass because he “wanted Israel to bleed just enough” to soften the way for post-war diplomacy.

Amid a series of Israeli intelligence failures in the lead-up to the war, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on October 6, 1973, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur.

“To make the airlift of a country available to a war-making country that is in the middle of a war is not something that is normally done. Has in fact never been done,” Kissinger said in the interview, which was carried out on an unspecified date.

“It was also the week in which vice president [Spiro] Agnew resigned, so it takes a special Israeli attitude to even ask that question, if you forgive me,” Kissinger said.

“I mean this was a huge step we took. It saved Israel,” the former secretary of state said.

March 1, 1973. US president Richard Nixon seated in the Oval Office with Israeli prime minister Golda Meir and Henry Kissinger. (Karl Schumacher/The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum/ National Archives and Records Administration)

Kissinger said that at the start, the US was under the impression that Israel was already winning the war.

“If you look at the days of the war… until Tuesday morning, we thought Israel was winning and was crossing the [Suez] canal. It was only Tuesday afternoon that [Israeli ambassador to the US Simcha] Dinitz came back to the United States [and explained the situation]. And it was not until Tuesday evening that I could reach Nixon because of the Agnew [situation],” Kissinger said.

When the war broke out, then-US president Richard Nixon was dealing with the resignation of Agnew over financial crimes, as the administration additionally grappled with the Watergate affair.

Kissinger had been in the job for less than a month.

In addition, according to the report, Kissinger has said then-US defense secretary James Schlesinger opposed the supply of weapons to Israel due to concerns of setting a precedent, and a potential response from Moscow.

The IDF’s Hermon Outpost in the Golan Heights on October 20, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War. (Defense Ministry Archives)

Kissinger said that in fact, much of the delay was due to the logistical issues of which planes could transport the weapons.

“We told the Israelis they could pick up any equipment with El Al; on that day we promised Israel that we would replace all its losses, and therefore said expend all equipment that you need, because we’re here. On the fourth day we started trying to get an airlift going,” Kissinger said.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban on the troubled Middle East. (AP Photo)

However, in an interview broadcast by Channel 12 news on Monday to mark Kissinger’s recent 100th birthday, the former secretary of state said of this comment that “nothing happened that could be interpreted in that way.”Sheba ongoing fightKeep Watchingblob:https://www.timesofisrael.com/dec6039d-a2b9-4857-b214-f22c8ebbd1d1

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Amid a series of Israeli intelligence failures in the lead-up to the war, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on October 6, 1973, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur.

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“It was also the week in which vice president [Spiro] Agnew resigned, so it takes a special Israeli attitude to even ask that question, if you forgive me,” Kissinger said.

“I mean this was a huge step we took. It saved Israel,” the former secretary of state said.

Kissinger said that at the start, the US was under the impression that Israel was already winning the war.

When the war broke out, then-US president Richard Nixon was dealing with the resignation of Agnew over financial crimes, as the administration additionally grappled with the Watergate affair.

Kissinger had been in the job for less than a month.

The IDF’s Hermon Outpost in the Golan Heights on October 20, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War. (Defense Ministry Archives)

Kissinger said that in fact, much of the delay was due to the logistical issues of which planes could transport the weapons.

“The normal thing is not to use the military airlift unless you’re a party to this [conflict]. It took [time] to find out whether that civilian airlift was possible against the opposition of the… military,” Kissinger said.

Nixon famously eventually said, “Tell them to send everything that can fly.”

Kissinger also said Israel considered a ceasefire a few days into the war, which he assessed was a “bad idea.”

“What happened also was on Thursday the Israelis were thinking of making a ceasefire. And we told them we will support anything you put forward. But in my judgment it is a very bad idea to make a ceasefire when you’ve lost territory,” Kissinger said.

The statesman, who turned 100 on Saturday, played a pivotal role in US foreign policy, with a long, and at times highly controversial, record.

He would later define “shuttle diplomacy” as he traveled between Israel and the capitals of the Arab world for talks.

Arab oil embargo

international relations [1973]

Arab oil embargo, temporary cessation of oil shipments from the Middle East to the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, imposed by oil-producing Arab countries in October 1973 in retaliation for support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War; the embargo on the United States was lifted in March 1974, though the embargo on the other countries remained in place for some time afterward. The Arab oil embargo was the first oil crisis, an oil-supply disruption leading to major price increases and a worldwide energy crisis. The embargo caused the United States and western European countries to reassess their dependence upon Middle Eastern oil. It also led to far-reaching changes in domestic energy policy, including increased domestic oil production in the United States and a greater emphasis on improving energy efficiency.

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Egyptian and Syrian forces made early gains across the Suez Canal and Golan Heights, but Israel quickly turned the tide, and within a few weeks Israeli troops had pushed forward into Egyptian and Syrian territory. In an attempt to pressure Western countries to force Israel to withdraw from seized lands, Arab members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) announced sharp production cuts and then banned the sale of oil to the United States and the Netherlands. Until that time, OPEC, which was formed in 1960, had kept a relatively low profile, mainly negotiating with international oil companies for better terms for member countries.

Enmity toward the United States among OPEC members had risen in the years preceding the embargo as a result of actions taken by U.S. President Richard M. Nixon to boost the sluggish American economy. For example, Nixon ordered the release of the dollar from the gold standard, which had been in place since the end of World War II. The resulting devaluation of the currency led to financial losses on the part of oil-producing countries, whose revenues consisted largely of U.S. dollars. Enormous increases in Western oil consumption—more than doubling over approximately the preceding 25 years—also contributed to the severity of the crisis, as people in the developed world had become accustomed to cheap gasoline and relatively stable prices.

After the imposition of the embargo, the price of a barrel of oil quadrupled by 1974. As a result, the United States experienced its first fuel shortage and first significant increase in gasoline prices since World War II. In response to the embargo, the U.S. government imposed fuel rationing and lowered speed limits to reduce consumption. Nixon seriously considered military action to seize oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi as a last resort. However, negotiations in Washington, D.C., led to the lifting of the embargo in March 1974.

The embargo laid bare one of the foremost challenges confronting U.S. policy in the Middle East, that of balancing the contradictory demands of unflinching support for Israel and the preservation of close ties to the Arab oil-producing monarchies. The strains on U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia revealed the difficulty of reconciling those demands. The U.S. response to the events of 1973–1974 also clarified the need to reconcile U.S. support for Israel to counterbalance Soviet influence in the Arab world with both foreign and domestic economic policies.

The full impact of the embargo, including high inflation and stagnation in oil importers, resulted from a complex set of factors beyond the proximate actions taken by the Arab members of OPEC. The declining leverage of the U.S. and European oil corporations (the “Seven Sisters”) that had hitherto stabilized the global oil market, the erosion of excess capacity of East Texas oil fields, and the recent decision to allow the U.S. dollar to float freely in the international exchange all played a role in exacerbating the crisis. Once the broader impact of these factors set in throughout the United States, it triggered new measures beyond the April and November 1973 efforts that focused on energy conservation and development of domestic energy sources. These measures included the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a national 55-mile-per-hour speed limit on U.S. highways, and later, President Gerald R. Ford’s administration’s imposition of fuel economy standards. It also prompted the creation of the International Energy Agency proposed by Kissinger.

Resources

origins.osu.edu, “The Yom Kippur War and the OPEC Oil Embargo.” By Edward Kunz; history.state.gov, “Shuttle Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1975.”; timesofisrael.com, “Kissinger denies delaying weapons airlifts to Israel during 1973 Yom Kippur War.” By Toi Staff; britannica.com, “Arab oil embargo: international relations [1973].” By Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica; history.state.gov, “Oil Embargo, 1973–1974.”;

Arab oil embargo

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