Who was Ultimately Responsible for the Pearl Harbor Tragedy?

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We just celebrated the 80th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, so what a better time to revisit this events surrounding this tragedy. I have been doing a great deal of research about the event from various aspects and views of the event, and now I believe that I have a firm enough grasp of the facts to make an educated assessment of what happened and who should bear the ultimate responsibilities for the failures surrounding Pear Harbor. You may say why am I bothering with this because on May 25, 1999, the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 52-47, passed a non-binding resolution to exonerate Kimmel and Short and requested that they be posthumously returned to their full rank. Even though Congress has requested that they both be reinstated to their previous rank the President has to agree to this, and up this point in time no standing President has done so. I will start this posting with my view and then I will spend the rest of this article defending it. I believe that the DOD got it right from the very beginning and no matter how many times the matter is reopened and studied you can’t get away from the fact that Admiral Kimmel and General Short failed to act in a appropriate manner wen it came down to the defense of Pearl Harbor. I believe that the Senate was wrong in reversing the original decision and I hope that a President does not sign off on it. It comes a time when someone has to bear responsibility. It was their duty to do so, they were both the supreme commanders in charge of protecting this base and the Pacific fleet stationed there. This article is going to be the first part of a two part series. The second part will be a discussion on 9/11 and how we got caught off guard again with a similar loss of life.

We all know what happened on that day, so a brief introduction should suffice. Eighty years ago on December 7, 1941, the military forces of the Empire of Japanese launched a sneak attack on the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and the surrounding facilities. Just before 8 a.m. on that Sunday morning, hundreds of Japanese fighter planes descended on the base, where they managed to destroy or damage nearly 20 American naval vessels, including eight battleships, and over 300 airplanes. More than 2,400 Americans died in the attack, including civilians, and another 1,000 people were wounded. The day after the assault, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan.

Now that you know what happened, how did Japan blindside us like that and gain such a lopsided victory in the opening salvo in the Pacific Theater?

There is no doubt that critical information regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor was not made available to either Kimmel or Short, whether it was by design or gross incompetence may never be known. However, Short and Kimmel were not individuals of limited ability. They displayed that they were not only skilled, knowledgeable on military matters, were able to evaluate situations and come up with solutions and so on, otherwise how would they have reached such elevated levels in the military? While we not actually in a declared war against the Axis we were very close to being so. We were already supplying military supplies to England, via the Lend Lease program. The only reason we were not already in the war was that the general population were against us getting embroiled in another World War. We know that these two commanders were not naive, they knew that the likelihood of us fighting not only Germany but Japan as well were very high. I am sure they were both students of history, and they had to know what happened in World War I with how it escalated to a global war due to all the secret alliances that had been made. They both knew that when your ally is attacked it is your duty to support them. When Japan declared war on the US, Germany immediately followed suit and declared war on the U.S. as well, even though they knew that it was a bad idea.

While Kimmel and Short did not have the exact date or the location where an attack was going to occur, they both knew it was inevitable. Let me give you a few examples, if you have a frayed rope do you keep on using it, of course the answer is no? Do you need to be told that touching a flame is a bad idea, of course not? Do you need to to be told that if you go out into the desert without any clothes on you will most likely get sunburned , again the answer is of course not? The point I am trying to make here is that you prepare for these things or you you just don’t do them. Would you jump out of an airplane without a parachute, again the answer is no? If you saw a car coming at you and was going to run you over, would you stand still? So Kimmel and Short knew that there was going to be an attack. It was their duty to prepare for that attack, whether it be tomorrow or in a month from now. It just seems like they both were crying over spilled milk and neither one of them wanted to man up. We know that they were not the only ones who dropped the ball, they were the ones who were ultimately responsible for seeing that we were ready for that eventuality.

Like I said we knew that our President knew that we were going to have to fight in this war. Secretary of War Stimson said in his own words, “The question was how we should maneuver them (Japan) into firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.” This was the plan that was devised to force the Hand of Japan.

The FDR Plan to Push Japan into Attacking the U.S.

Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.
Send a division of a long-range cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
Keep the main strength of the US Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian islands.
Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demand for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.

Prior to the attack by Japan on Pearl harbor, our cryptologists had been working overtime to break the various codes used by the Japanese. They ended up being wildly successful. They were able to decrypt over 95% of all transmissions made by the Japanese. So it is certainly apparent that we knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor. The code-breaking plan was entitled a “splendid arrangement.” Washington had a direct line of communication from the code breakers stationed in the Hawaiian Islands with additional services being provided in Washington DC. It is apparent that not only FDR was informed on an almost daily basis of the Japanese plans so were our soon to be British allies and several other highly ranked generals and admirals. The only ones that truly mattered were Kimmel and Short and they were left out of the loop. Kimmel was ordered to keep the fleet at Peal Harbor. Though he did one thing that saved our bacon so to speak he moved out our aircraft carriers and all of the modern ships of the fleet out and left a token force of WWI ships. Those were the ones destroyed by the Japanese navy. It turns out that Kimmel had been informed of an generic attack in the Pacific, mainly involving the Philippines and a few other island chains. Nowhere was it documented that Pearl Harbor was the main target.

So while he did take efforts that spared the total destruction of our fleet, we still lost way too many men and ships.

The following statements were made in the Dorn Report in 1995. While I had planned on giving this well thought out list of reasons why I thought Kimmel and Short were still culpable, the Dorn Report beat me to it.

-Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew that their primary mission–indeed, virtually their only mission–was to prepare for war with Japan.

-General Shor’s mission was to protect the fleet at Pearl Harbor; Admiral Kimmel had the duty to cooperate with the Army in defense of the fleet, and he also had the “general duty” to “take all practicable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for battle.”

-Both men knew that war with Japan was highly likely; moreover by 27 November 1941, when each received a “war warning” from Washington, both Kimmel and Short knew that the initial Japanese attack could occur within days or weeks.

-Both Kimmel and Short knew that, if war came, Japan would strike the first blow, if only because the United States would not; the two men knew that a surprise attack would probably precede a declaration of war.

-Kimmel and Short both knew that the initial Japanese attack could fall on Pearl Harbor(and the fact that they took vigorous measures to defend against submarine attack and sabotage testifies tom their understanding that the war could come to Pearl Harbor).

-Kimmel and Short knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor could come in the form of an attack from aircraft carriers.

-Both officers knew from their own staffs of the danger of surprise air attack.

-Kimmel and Short knew from recent events that the idea of a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor was not knew.

-Both men made statements prior to 7 November 1941 that acknowledged the possibility of an air attack on their forces. Kimmel, for example, in a letter to Admiral Stark on 18 February 1941 stated, “I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility.” Similarly, the 14 August 1941 Honolulu Advertiser, in an article title “General Short Sees Danger of Oahu Air Raid,” quoted Short as saying that “an attack upon these islands is not impossible and in certain situations it might not be improbable.”

-Admiral Kimmel was briefed on 2 December 1941 that American intelligence had lost track of the Japanese carriers.

While it is highly unlikely that Pearl Harbor could have been prevented, the damage done certainly could have been lessened.

Together, Admiral Kimmel and General short had 49 serviceable Catalina
long-range patrol aircraft, and six serviceable B-17 long-range bombers
useful for reconnaissance. They also had a significant force of cruisers
with embarked scout-observation floatplanes, destroyers, several land

based radar stations capable of detecting aircraft at substantial
ranges, coast watch stations, nearly a hundred P-40 fighter aircraft

(the most modern in the American inventory), and several
hundred antiaircraft guns on land and on ships in the harbor.
There were significant competing demands on the delicate Catalinas and
practical limitations on the employment of each of the other resources.
Nevertheless, if properly employed in an integrated and coordinated
fashion at a reasonable state of readiness, these resources could have
made an enormous and perhaps critical difference in the events of
December 7.
only the guns on the ships were able to respond in significant numbers
on December 7. However, not all were able to respond immediately.

The reconnaissance aircraft were being conserved for other tasks. The
use of destroyers and cruisers and their float planes in reconnaissance
apparently was not considered. The radars were used only for training,

and not during the hours of the attack. The coast watch stations
were not manned. The fighters were on four-hour alert. Mobile land based

antiaircraft guns were not deployed, and ammunition was kept
separate from the guns. And, despite the existence of agreements and
plans for cooperation in air defense, the air defense system was not
coordinated between the Army and the Navy.
Six mobile radar stations had been operating daily. They were, however,

only training. As General short said: “At that time we had just
gotten in the machines and set up. I thought this was fine training for
them. I was trying to get training and was doing it for training more
than any idea that it would be real … ” Most were in action in four minutes.

The fratricide wrought on U.S. aircraft from the Enterprise attempting to land

at Ford Island later that day suggests what fully alerted gun crews

might have done to the first wave of Japanese torpedo bombers.
An Army radar, scheduled to have been shut down, in fact detected
the approaching Japanese aircraft fifty minutes before they struck the
fleet, but the contacts were erroneously presumed friendly. Given the
newness of the equipment, and its inexperienced operators, the belief
that the approaching aircraft were “friendlies” was not unreasonable.
The few fighter aircraft able to take to the air were highly effective.

Finally, passive defense measures were available which might have
mitigated the effect of the raids that did occur. First, training
patterns could have been altered in response to heightened tensions. The
Navy trained hard during the week, but its ships generally were in port
on Saturdays and Sundays. The touchstone of Japanese planning was this
predictable ship location. Second, aircraft revetments had been
constructed but were not used because the fear of sabotage was greater

than the fear of air attack. Had some aircraft been in revetments, rather

than lined up wing-to-wing, losses in material would have been initiated.

Third, anti-torpedo baffles or nets could have been used
within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. These
items were not furnished to Admiral Kimmel, but they might have been
requested. Fourth, Admiral Kimmel and General short could have used
barrage balloons in selected areas to restrict the most dangerous air
approaches to “battleship row.”

Admiral Kimmel’s predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had decided
against torpedo baffles or nets, and Admiral Kimmel inherited this
decision. Had Admiral Kimmel seen the possibility of a torpedo aerial
attack, however, he might have requested the Navy Department to furnish
him with such items, or at least the equipment to manufacture them.

Certainly, Admiral Kimmel was aware that his ships were

vulnerable to such an attack.

There were obviously many things that could have been done to mitigate the damage done. Even something a simple as a sense of urgency displayed by the commanding officers would have helped. The battle ships were all placed closely together, which made it easy for strafing and bombing runs. They could have altered the routine for the ships, the Japanese knew when the boilers would be cold and were therefore not able to make rapid escape runs. Watertight bulkheads were opened so that when the ships were hit by torpedoes, the ships quickly flooded. The state of readiness on board these ships was appalling.

This lack or preparedness ultimately falls on the commanding officers and their bosses. It appears that Kimmel and Short fell into the too comfortable routine of bureaucrats instead of commanding officers, where complacency is the enemy. On the day of the attack they were playing golf.

Conclusion

The conclusion of the Dorn Report mirrors mine exactly.

An examination of the record does not show that advancement of Admiral
Kimmel and General short on the retired list is warranted.

Resources

“Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report.” By Fred Borch and Daniel Martinez; “The Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor.” By Robert B. Stinnett; “Admiral Kimmel’s Story.” By Husband E. Kimmel; “A Matter of Honor, Pearl Harbor: Betrayal, Blame, and A Family’s Quest for Justice.” By Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan; “At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.” By Gordon W. Prange; wm.edu. “Reasons to Support the Advancement of
Rear Admiral Kimmel on the Retired List”; History.com, “Pearl Harbor.” By History.com Editors; esd.whs.mil, “Dorn Report on Kimmel and Short 1995”;

Addendum

On May 25, 1941 Admiral Kimmel wrote the following letter to the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject: “Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet.” While it is certainly clear in what the situation and what his needs were to effectively complete his duties, it does not totally exculpate him and justify his lack of preparedness on December 7, 1941.

Common Sense and Ramblings In America

Who was Ultimately Responsible for the Pearl Harbor Tragedy?

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