I have written several articles on postings related to politics. A list of links has been provided at the bottom of this article for your convenience. This article will, however, address different aspects of these political events.

The United States has many intelligence agencies to address diverse needs, such as protecting national security, conducting foreign intelligence, and investigating domestic threats like terrorism and espionage. Each agency has a unique mission and area of expertise, which can include collecting human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), or geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). This structure allows for specialization, parallel capabilities, and different customer bases (e.g., policymakers, military commanders) to be served by tailored intelligence products. 

Different Missions and Jurisdictions

• Domestic vs. Foreign: Some agencies, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), focus on domestic intelligence and law enforcement, investigating crimes like terrorism and espionage within the U.S.. Others, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are primarily tasked with gathering intelligence abroad.
• Specific Types of Intelligence: Agencies specialize in different forms of intelligence gathering. The National Security Agency (NSA) focuses on signals intelligence (collecting and analyzing foreign communications and electronic signals), while the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) deals with imagery and geospatial intelligence from satellites.
• Departmental and Military Intelligence: Many intelligence functions are housed within specific government departments or military branches. For example, the Department of Defense and its various military branches have their own intelligence divisions to support their specific missions. 

Benefits of Multiple Agencies

• Specialized Expertise: Having specialized agencies allows for deeper expertise in particular fields, providing a multi-dimensional view of complex issues.
• Collaboration and Coordination: The U.S. Intelligence Community is designed for collaboration, with agencies sharing information and resources to produce comprehensive intelligence assessments for national leaders.
• Addressing Diverse Threats: The sheer volume and variety of threats (from foreign nations to terrorist groups and cyberattacks) require a wide range of capabilities and approaches to effectively protect the country.
• Serving Different Customers: Different customers, such as policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders, have unique intelligence needs, and multiple agencies are structured to meet these varied requirements. 

How The Ic Works

The Intelligence Community is made up of 18 elements that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission.

Air Force Intelligence

The Sixteenth Air Force, reactivated on 11 October 2019 following the merger of the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Air Forces, provides multisource intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) products, cyber and electronic warfare, and information operations. Additionally, it is the Service Cryptologic Component responsible to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service and the Service Cyber Component to US Cyber Command.

Army Intelligence and Security Command

The U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) executes mission command of operational intelligence and security forces; conducts and synchronizes worldwide multi-discipline and all-source intelligence and security operations; and delivers linguist support and intelligence-related advanced skills training, acquisition support, logistics, communications, and other specialized capabilities in support of Army, Joint, and Coalition Commands and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created in 1947 with the signing of the National Security Act by President Harry S. Truman. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) serves as the head of the CIA and reports to the Director of National Intelligence. The CIA assists the DCIA in carrying out the following responsibilities:

• Collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means; the CIA/DCIA has no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;
• Correlating and evaluating intelligence related to national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence;
• Providing overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the U.S. Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensuring that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection; and
• Performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.

Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community in support of U.S. military planning and operations, and weapon systems acquisition. DIA’s diverse workforce is skilled in military history and doctrine, economics, physics, chemistry, world history, political science, bio-sciences, and computer sciences to name a few. DIA officers travel the world, and meet and work closely with professionals from foreign countries.

Dept. of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence activities throughout the DOE complex, including nearly 30 offices nationwide. The Office protects vital national security information and technologies, representing intellectual property of incalculable value. Its distinctive contribution to national security is the ability to leverage DOE’s unmatched scientific and technological expertise in support of policymakers as well as national security missions in defense, homeland security, cyber security, intelligence, and energy security.

Dept. of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis

The mission of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. I&A is the only Intelligence Community (IC) element statutorily charged with delivering intelligence to our state, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners, and developing intelligence from those partners for the Department and the IC.

I&A’s customers and partners are DHS leadership; DHS components; state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners; and the IC, all of whom require and generate homeland security intelligence and information.

Dept. of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s (INR) primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve U.S. diplomacy. Secretary of State George Marshall established INR in 1947. INR is a direct descendant of the Office of Strategic Services Research Department and the oldest civilian intelligence element in the U.S. Government.

Drawing on all-source intelligence, INR provides value-added independent analysis of events to State Department policymakers; ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes; and serves as the focal point in the State Department for ensuring policy review of sensitive counterintelligence and law enforcement activities around the world. The bureau directs the Department’s program of intelligence analysis and research, liaises with the Intelligence Community, and represents the Department on committees and in interagency intelligence groups. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues.

Dept. of Treasury Office of Intelligence & Analysis

The mission and culture of Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), created under the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, builds on a strong tradition of intelligence and national security at the Department. OIA advances national security and protects financial integrity by informing Treasury decisions with timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence and analysis. It supports this mission by:

• Driving intelligence to meet the priorities of Treasury decision-makers and external customers;
• Producing all-source assessments and other material to identify threats and vulnerabilities in licit and illicit networks that may be addressed by Treasury-led action;
• Delivering timely, accurate, relevant intelligence to decision-makers; and
• Providing the security infrastructure necessary to safeguard the Treasury’s national security information.

Drug Enforcement Administration Intelligence Program

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is responsible for enforcing the controlled substance laws and regulations of the United States. DEA’s Intelligence Program helps initiate new investigations of major drug organizations, strengthens ongoing investigations and subsequent prosecutions, develops information that leads to seizures and arrests, and provides policy-makers with drug trend information upon which programmatic decisions can be based.

DEA’s Intelligence Program consists of several entities that are staffed by both Intelligence Analysts and Special Agents: Intelligence groups/functions in the domestic field divisions, district, resident, and foreign offices; the El Paso Intelligence Center; and the Intelligence Division at DEA Headquarters.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an intelligence-driven and threat-focused national security organization with both intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities. It is the principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Justice and a full member of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The FBI has the authority and responsibility to investigate specific crimes assigned to it and to provide other law enforcement agencies with cooperative services, such as fingerprint identification, laboratory examinations, and training. The FBI also gathers, shares, and analyzes intelligence, both to support its own investigations and those of its partners and to better understand and combat the security threats facing the United States. In addition to its traditional law enforcement partnerships, the FBI works closely with private sector partners to share information on emerging threats through its leadership in organizations such as the Domestic Security Alliance Council  and InfraGard .

Marine Corps Intelligence

The Marine Corps Intelligence mission is to provide commanders at every level seamless, tailored, timely, and mission-essential intelligence and to ensure this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process. Since Marine Corps intelligence activities are oriented toward the operational and tactical levels, two-thirds of all intelligence Marines serve in the operating forces, with the majority assigned to the staffs and units of tactical commands. Marine Corps Intelligence also provides the basis for all training, doctrine, and equipment development, and supports Marine Corps-specific and operational missions in maritime, expeditionary, land, and air warfare. Functionally, Marine Corps Intelligence provides intelligence support through its traditional intelligence disciplines consisting of: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counter Intelligence (CI), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) delivers world-class geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) that provides a decisive advantage to policymakers, warfighters, intelligence professionals, and first responders. NGA is the lead federal agency for GEOINT and manages a global consortium of more than 400 commercial and government relationships. The director of NGA serves as the functional manager for GEOINT, the head of the National System for Geospatial Intelligence and the coordinator of the global Allied System for Geospatial Intelligence. In its multiple roles, NGA receives guidance and oversight from the Department of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and Congress.

National Reconnaissance Office

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is the U.S. Government agency in charge of designing, building, launching, and maintaining America’s intelligence satellites. Whether creating the latest innovations in satellite technology, contracting with the most cost-efficient industrial supplier, conducting rigorous launch schedules, or providing the highest-quality products to customers, the NRO is always focused on protecting the U.S. and its citizens.

The NRO was created in 1961 and declassified to the public in 1992 and has consistently provided reconnaissance support to the Intelligence Community and Department of Defense. The NRO’s vision is Supra Et Ultra: Above and Beyond.

National Security Agency

The National Security Agency (NSA) leads the U.S. Government in cryptology that encompasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) products and services, and enables Computer Network Operations in order to gain a decision advantage for the nation and our allies under all circumstances. The Central Security Service (CSS), part of NSA, provides timely and accurate cryptologic support, knowledge, and assistance to the military cryptologic community. CSS coordinates and develops policy and guidance on the SIGINT and IA missions of NSA/CSS to ensure military integration.

Office of Naval Intelligence

The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is a core element of the Navy’s Information Warfare Community whose goal is to gain and hold a decisive information advantage over America’s potential adversaries. ONI collects, analyzes, and produces relevant maritime intelligence and disseminates that intelligence rapidly to key strategic, operational, and tactical decision-makers to meet Navy, Department of Defense, and national requirements. ONI’s integrated workforce of active duty and Reserve naval and civilian professionals supports combat operations and provides vital information for planning America’s defense against maritime threats at home and around the world. ONI produces maritime intelligence on naval weapons and technology proliferation, transnational threats in civil maritime counter-proliferation, counter-narcotics and the global maritime environment, and other activities that directly support the U.S. Navy, joint warfighters, and national decision-makers and agencies.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The DNI also acts as the principal advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security. The president appoints the DNI with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is staffed by officers from across the IC and is organized into component offices. These offices fall under three main areas of focus: Core Mission, Enablers, and Oversight. Internal staff offices execute the administrative functions of the ODNI, including management of the ODNI Program within the NIP.

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence

The U.S. Coast Guard’s Intelligence Unit conducts intelligence activities to provide timely, objective, relevant, and actionable maritime intelligence to drive operations, enable mission support, and inform decision-making for Coast Guard and Homeland Security missions and National Security requirements. Their vision is a nation safeguarded by an intelligence-driven Coast Guard.

U.S. Space Force

The U.S. Space Force, the first new organization to join the Intelligence Community since 2006, was established in December 2019, within the Department of the Air Force, meaning the Secretary of the Air Force has overall responsibility for the USSF, under the guidance and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

Space has become essential to our security and prosperity. Space systems are woven into the fabric of our way of life and is fundamental to our economic system. From the satellites that power the GPS technology that we use every day, or allow us to surf the web and call our friends, or enable first responders to communicate with each other in times of crisis, or orchestrate transactions in the world financial market, or even allow us to use credit cards at gas pumps.

The USSF organizes, trains, and equips space forces in order to protect U.S. and allied interests in space and to provide space capabilities to our joint military forces.

Opinion | We Already Have 18 Intelligence Agencies. We Still Need 1 More.

The Commerce Department needs its own intel officers to take on China.

Figuring out what, exactly, China is up to is one of the intelligence community’s top priorities. Countering Beijing also happens to be a rare instance where there’s bipartisan support in Congress.

But what new lawmakers will quickly discover — especially those joining the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — is that a glaring gap exists that will impact Congress’ efforts to do so. The U.S. cannot adequately address its national security challenges related to China, which are increasingly driven by technology, without the help of a potentially surprising partner: the Department of Commerce.

Unfortunately, the department itself lacks the critical support needed for these efforts. Most crucial: Commerce needs its own intelligence agency.

My last job in the U.S. government was overseeing the intelligence community’s role in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), along with an interagency group formerly known as Team Telecom, and being responsible for the intelligence community’s engagement with our foreign allies’ own investment security efforts. The cases that come before CFIUS are privileged and not publicly disclosed. But I can say this: The most challenging ones usually revolved around issues of advanced or dual-use technology, an area in which the Department of Commerce plays a critical role given its international trade and export control responsibilities.

Today, the Department of Commerce is an agency unexpectedly on the frontlines of vital U.S. national and economic security challenges, most prominently demonstrated by its leading role on ensuring critical access to semiconductors, and as evidenced by the CHIPS Act and recent rules promulgated by the department to protect against even knowledge transfers between the United States and China.

But these efforts are certain to be a beginning for Commerce, not an end. And a dedicated in-house intel agency can better identify emerging threats and challenges from China that Commerce needs to tackle, including potential spyware and other intrusions embedded in foreign technology. For instance, in late November, the U.S. issued a ban on new Huawei and ZTE equipment — along with that of three other Chinese companies — for fear it would be used to spy on Americans. Last month, Congress proposed limiting U.S. exposure to Chinese 5G leaders, including Huawei, by restricting their access to U.S. banks, adding them to Treasury’s Specifically Designated Nationals List.

In fact, Commerce’s current position is not unlike that of the Treasury Department’s in 2004.

That year — as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act — Congress established the current iteration of Treasury’s intelligence agency, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and formally made it part of the broader intel community. Since then, OIA has played a critical role for almost two decades combating terrorist financing, helping support sanctions efforts and providing financial intelligence to Treasury policymakers.

OIA’s successes would simply not have been possible without it being a full, integrated member of the intelligence community. Indeed, its assessments often find their way to the White House and to other senior policymakers across town, even as its primary focus is supporting the Treasury Department.

In the same way, the Commerce Department cannot be expected to play a more fulsome role in U.S. national security if its leaders are not fully informed of the strategic goals and illicit tactical efforts of U.S. adversaries. To meet that expectation, requires the launch of a new, 19th intel agency to be housed at the department.

Most Americans think of intelligence and by default conjure up images of the CIA. But there are 18 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, most housed in various departments or military services, and dedicated to providing the kind of intelligence support to a secretary or commander, that CIA continues to lead the way in providing to the White House.

Members of Congress who for the first time are serving on the Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services or other prominent national security-related committees and sub-committees, may be surprised to learn that despite what they may have gleaned from the media, the intel community does not actually make predictions; it makes judgments. The difference is critical.

Predictions are generally fleeting: right and wrong, winners and losers, black and white. Judgments are far more complicated. They address the likelihood of events and emergence of prospective capabilities; the potential follow-on implications and challenges from an event occurring — or not; and the associated risks and opportunities for U.S. national and economic security.

These conclusions are what the intelligence community informs policymakers of, to help them make the best decisions possible.

Not only would Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo benefit greatly from having her own intel agency providing these types of assessments directly to her, but so too would the rest of the department, including the Bureau of Industry and Security, which is responsible for export controls, and the International Trade Administration, which defends U.S. industry against unfair trade practices of foreign allies and adversaries.

In creating the new agency, the Director of National Intelligence and Congress must ensure it does not simply result from merging together overworked and under-supported disparate parts of the department that seem to fit. Less than two years ago, Commerce’s national security work was overshadowed by a rogue and illegal security operation at the department — and neither it nor the U.S. government can afford a repeat.

Rather, a new agency must be stood up and staffed by leaders and analysts who are intel community professionals that know how to blend complex analytic efforts with the priorities of the department. Having this type of experienced leadership will ensure the development of novel and Commerce-centric analysis, all while adhering to intelligence tradecraft and community standards.

A new intel agency at the Commerce Department won’t end the national security challenges the U.S. faces from China; but it will help policymakers mitigate and overcome them.

Why are there so many federal agencies, and how do they all work together?

The simple answer is that at some point, people (either the public or senior government officials) felt a compelling need to create that agency. How well do they work together? That varies with the field and the leadership. The IC didn’t play well originally. But with the creation of the ODNI and then appointing someone like James Clapper who spoke truth to power and attempted to be an honest broker rather than push a particular agenda. Some Departments are very decentralized, some are very centralized (thus—more oversight and control).

I know it’s pretty popular to say that government should be streamlines, a lot of agencies should be eliminated. I’m sure there are some cases where that’s true. But I also remember talking to someone at the FBI. And he told me that given the number of different Law Enforcement organizations in DC (with subsequent overlaps and oversight), it’s very hard for corruption to continue like it does in many other countries. Quite simply, if there is a precinct in DC that is getting payoffs from local businesses, it’s likely that the Northern Virginia or Southern Maryland (that’s 5 separate police jurisdictions right there) or State police will get wind of it. Or the FBI. Or the Dept. of Justice. Or depending upon the nature of the payoffs, the Treasury Dept. Or the IRS. Or the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Or the Postal Service. Or possibly even a Congressional subcommittee with their subpoena power.

And there are some good reasons why we have so many agencies (other than: people wanted them). First, there are USG responsibilities now that we didn’t have 30 years ago (or they were much smaller years ago). Look at NARA and the need to archive email, websites, texts. Wildfires have expanded and we have a longer wildfire season. Would you say that the US Border Patrol should return to 1980 staffing levels? The regulation of imports of foreign food was much easier 50 years ago than it is today (where Americans insist on having strawberries in January or french fries at MacDonalds when it isn’t potato season here in the US). Airspace is much more crowded these days then it was previously requiring more air traffic control. The same with maritime traffic. The people at NORAD would tell you their job is far more chaotic and challenging now due to the number of launches of civilian vehicles in to space. FEMA faces greater challenges now than we did when the agency was first created. There are pathogens and viruses and gene manipulation on a level that we didn’t see 50 years ago. Law enforcement 50 years ago wasn’t dealing with the “dark web,” didn’t face the sophistication of counterfeit currency we face today coming out of North Korea and Israel, didn’t have a serious risk of WMDs. The stock market is bigger and the regulation and oversight of it is more complex. The number of vehicles on the road is greater.

Second, this concept of “big” and “small” government doesn’t really address the issue. In 1947, the ratio of USG civilian employees to US Citizens was about 1 to 90. In 2014, the ratio of USG civilian employees to US citizens was about 1 to 160. Quite simply, the growth of the civilian workforce of the USG hasn’t kept pace with the growth of the US population OR the numbers of areas the USG needs to play a role in.

Intelligence Community Management

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) consists of 18 organizations, such as the intelligence components of the five military services within the Department of Defense (DOD) as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These organizations independently and collaboratively gather, analyze, and produce the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which heads the IC, works to ensure that things like standards, processes, and tools across the community are consistent and efficient. 

The U.S. Intelligence Community

However, the IC could improve how it manages its workforce, supports military operations, and manages its intelligence infrastructure.   

For example: 

• Personnel vetting.  The government’s security clearance (which is on the High Risk List) and other “personnel vetting” processes help ensure that federal employees are trustworthy. Personnel vetting decisions are supposed to be reciprocal: if one agency clears an employee, that employee should be able to transfer to another agency without a new background check. But the Offices of Personnel Management and the Director of National Intelligence—who oversee the vetting processes—don’t have good data on how often this works.   

• Intelligence oversight and management. The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis leads the department’s “Intelligence Enterprise”—which includes relevant offices within DHS components, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Federal Protective Service. The office performs strategic oversight and helps ensure DHS components coordinate their intelligence and related activities. However, this office hasn’t consistently completed some of its oversight tasks. For example, it didn’t finish an Intelligence Enterprise budget until 2024, even though it had been required by policy since 2013. 

• Use of satellites. Commercial satellite companies can play a key role in providing imagery and data critical to national security issues. For example, the war in Ukraine has drawn attention to how governments are using commercial satellites to track troop movement and the impact of attacks. The IC and DOD, however, have a slow and cumbersome approach to incorporating emerging commercial capabilities. Until they address this, the U.S. risks losing a technological advantage over emerging competitors, like China.  

Eyes on the watchers

Understanding the nation’s intelligence community

Americans love spy movies. But few understand what the U.S. intelligence community does to help political leaders navigate a dangerous and changing world.

One factor: We learn more about them from Hollywood than the agencies themselves. Secrecy is inherent to their work, like monitoring foreign military operations, courting sources in hostile governments or surveilling terrorist organizations.

Today, these agencies are under a political microscope, bracing for mass layoffs and budget cuts. But what’s happening behind the curtain? Here’s the breakdown.

$106.3 billion

The intelligence community’s annual budget — more than the Afghan war at its peak — funds 18 specialized agencies and elements within other departments, like Energy and Treasury. The CIA recruits foreign agents and runs covert operations overseas. The NSA intercepts data and decrypts codes. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency analyzes and predicts how events play out on physical terrains. All coordinate with the director of national intelligence, whose office briefs the president daily.

14th Century B.C.

The oldest record of intel gathering is Egypt’s “Amarna Letters,” hundreds of cuneiform-inscribed clay tablets that detail social upheaval and geopolitical news across Mesopotamia, as reported by the pharaoh’s emissaries to Canaan and Amurru (in modern Israel and Syria). From Moses to Sun Tzu, the Mongols to the Aztecs, historical leaders and empires have relied on intelligence from spies and other sources to understand the world and make informed decisions.

George Washington: Spymaster

Before he became the first president, he launched America’s first intel operation. During the Revolutionary War, the general set up spy rings, instituted codes and ciphers, hired a physician to invent invisible ink, and even recruited a double agent close to his red-coated counterpart, Gen. Charles Cornwallis. “Washington did not really outfight the British,” quipped one British agent. “He simply outspied us.”

13,000 spies

That’s how many men and women served the Office of Strategic Services at the height of World War II. More than half completed combat and espionage missions overseas. The OSS was our first attempt to centralize intel operations after the disastrous failure to predict the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Disbanded in 1945, it was soon replaced by the CIA, which now has about 21,575 employees, including field agents, analysts and covert operatives.

Executive Order 11905

President Gerald Ford banned political assassinations in 1976, after the Senate’s “Church Committee” uncovered CIA plots to kill Fidel Castro and others. It reported that the CIA abetted a coup in Chile, drugged and tortured Americans in mind control experiments, infiltrated civil rights groups and recruited 50 journalists as propaganda assets. It also learned that the NSA was digging through the general public’s telephone traffic. More reforms followed in subsequent administrations, limiting intel work for a generation.

45 days in 2001

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Congress quickly restructured the intelligence community after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. With an increased focus on threats inside the nation’s borders, the Division of Homeland Security was created 11 days later, and the FBI launched its own intelligence unit within a few years. But perhaps the most fundamental changes were tucked away in a 300-page bill enacted that Oct. 26. The Patriot Act authorized pervasive, warrantless domestic surveillance.

7 in 10 misinformed

At least 71 percent of Americans inaccurately believe that the NSA builds spy satellites, interrogates detainees or targets foreign terrorists. Half don’t know that codebreaking is still a core mission. And it’s still not entirely clear what data or metadata the NSA collects on Americans — much of it likely stored at the Utah Data Center near Salt Lake City. One of the agency’s four such facilities nationwide, it is perhaps the world’s biggest in storage capacity.

$2 million seed money

In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capital fund, made a modest investment in 2003 Silicon Valley startup Palantir, now a $6 billion analytics giant helping militaries, police and intel agencies to make predictions and decisions using big data and artificial intelligence. Practitioners still argue the merits of traditional spycraft — like HUMINT, or human intelligence — and targeted electronic intercepts, but even the DEA and FBI operate mass data collection programs.

The U.S. Intelligence Community is Bigger Than Ever, But is It Worth It?

The U.S. spends more than $1 trillion on national security annually, but a lack of transparency prevents us from knowing if these programs are actually working.

Crossposted on Defense One.

The U.S. spends nearly $1 trillion on national security programs and agencies annually, more than any other nation in the world. Yet despite this enormous investment, there is not enough evidence to show the public that these programs are keeping Americans any safer – especially in the intelligence community. Excessive government secrecy prohibits the public and oversight agencies alike from determining whether our expensive intelligence enterprise is worth the investment.

The United States intelligence community is comprised of 17 federal agencies assigned an array of missions relating to national defense, foreign relations, homeland security and law enforcement. These agencies form just the foundation of a sprawling enterprise that incorporates intelligence and non-intelligence components of many other federal agencies, state and local police, including fire and emergency response, international government partners, as well as private companies and organizations.

These entities connect through an array of information sharing platforms and portals, including the National Counterterrorism Center, the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, 71 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, 56 Field Intelligence Groups, and 78 state and local intelligence fusion centers, which can incorporate military and private sector participants. Information collected by any of them can be distributed through official information sharing systems like the Defense Department’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, or SIPRNet; the U.S. Navy’s Law Enforcement Information Exchange, or LInX; the Department of Homeland Security Information Network, or HSIN; the Director of National Intelligence’s Information Sharing Environment, or ISE; and the FBI’s eGuardian, National Data Exchange, or N-DEx; National Crime Information Center, or NCIC; and Law Enforcement Online, or LEO, among others.

FBI and Department of Homeland Security officials operate several private sector intelligence sharing organizations as well, including the Domestic Security Advisory Council, InfraGard, and the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance. They have established formal “strategic partnerships” with certain businesses and universities for counter-intelligence and counterterrorism purposes. Private industries and “key” resources the government deemed “critical infrastructure” have established 18 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers. In 2010, the Washington Post documented almost 2,000 private companies working on counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence. Over 5 million government employees and private contractors now hold security clearances giving them access to classified information.

U.S. intelligence agencies also have close working relationships with international partners, including the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the “five eyes” agreement. They share intelligence with other nations such as Israel and Saudi Arabia through memoranda of understanding, or other less formal agreements. The U.S. military maintains from 598 to 1,000 bases and installations in at least 40 foreign countries.

The annual intelligence budget exceeds $70 billion per year, but that figure represents just a small portion of what the U.S. spends on national defense and homeland security.

The nonpartisan Project on Government Oversight and the Columbia Journalism Review back up Friedman’s estimate that the U.S. now spends roughly $1 trillion a year for national security. This figure dwarfs the combined defense budgets of all possible contenders, combined.

Friedman argues that the threats we face today don’t justify such profligate spending. Protected by oceans and bordered by friendly nations, there’s little risk of a foreign invasion. Deaths from wars and other political violence abroad have sharply decreased as well. Terrorism and violent crime in the U.S. are at historically low levels.

Yet despite the relative safety our nation enjoys and the enormous effort and expense dedicated toward strengthening U.S. security, Americans feel less safe than any time since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. So the question isn’t just whether our national security measures are necessary, but whether they work. Do our intelligence agencies actually improve U.S. security and give policy makers the best available information to make wise policy decisions?

Unfortunately, the excessive secrecy shrouding intelligence activities means Americans have little public information from which to evaluate whether the intelligence enterprise is worth the investment.

There are many culprits we can blame for spreading undue public fear, from a sensationalist media to manipulative politicians. But a significant part of the problem is that intelligence officials are incentivized to exaggerate threats, which risks the misapplication of security resources and poor national security policies.

Once the threat assessment process is corrupted this way, resources will be misdirected as policy makers overemphasize threats that resonate with the public, while ignoring ones that don’t, leaving us vulnerable even as security resources are squandered. The FBI’s 2004 warnings about increasing mortgage fraud fell on deaf ears in the intelligence establishment, for example, which waited until 2009 before it identified the resulting global economic meltdown as the primary threat to national security.

Americans’ ability to hold our government officials accountable for national security policy decisions requires public information about the threats and the measures necessary to protect us from them. As Friedman has argued, there isn’t a simple formula for defending American security, “but skepticism — toward both what we are told to fear and the defenses we are sold to confront it — is a good start.”

Time for U.S. Intelligence to Ask: How Did We Alienate so Many Americans?

For the sake of national security, the intelligence community must take stock of the underlying reasons why it is losing the trust and goodwill of the American people and their representatives in Congress.

Consider the recent, intense debate over the reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). In that legislative struggle, the Biden administration, the intelligence community, and its champions on Capitol Hill invested everything they had to defeat an amendment offered by House leaders of both the conservative Freedom Caucus and the Progressive Caucus. This unprecedented, pan-ideological reform coalition sought to add a warrant requirement for situations in which federal agencies inspect the communications of Americans caught up in the surveillance, pursuant to Section 702, of foreign threats on foreign soil.

The U.S. intelligence community (IC) turned to tactics that had worked well in the past. The IC and others opposed to the amendment turned to Russian nuclear space weapons. Members were herded into SCIFs – secure compartments safe from wiretapping – to hear classified briefings on other threatening developments. FBI Director Christopher Wray warned that a warrant requirement would have “real-world consequences” in a world bristling with terror threats.

U.S. intelligence won the vote in April – but this time only by a whisker – a vote of 212 to 212, which meant the warrant requirement failed by a single tie-breaking vote. While barely scraping out a win on warrants, the intelligence community lost ground elsewhere. It wanted Section 702’s next reauthorization to be set five years from the vote. Congress dialed that back to two years, a short window that has already sparked a fresh debate about the reach of U.S. intelligence programs.

The left-right surveillance reform coalition posted other wins. Congress passed Rep. Chip Roy’s amendment putting the FBI under a microscope, requiring quarterly reports on the number of times the bureau searches, or “queries,” the communications of Americans in Section 702 databases. It also reduced the number of FBI personnel who can query Americans’ communications under Section 702 The practice of “abouts” collection, in which an American could be surveilled for a mere third-party mention, was moved from programmatic suspension to termination by a successful amendment offered by Rep. Ben Cline. 

The House also passed the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act in a standalone vote with bipartisan support, 219-199. This bill would require the FBI and other federal agencies to obtain a probable cause warrant before purchasing Americans’ personal data, including internet records and location histories. Passage of this bill by the House validates it and gives it momentum in the Senate.

The response from the intelligence community and its defenders to these reverses and near losses has been incredulity.

Such reverses have occurred, some in the intelligence community assert, because of “bad faith attacks” by “U.S. lawmakers on the far left and the far right.” We are told these ill-informed attacks explain why the poll numbers show declining appreciation by Americans of the vital role played by intelligence agencies. David V. Gioe, Michael S. Goodman and Michael V. Hayden have written in Foreign Policy about a University of Texas at Austin (UT) & Chicago Council on Global Affairs study that shows “a growing number of Americans thought that the intelligence community represented a threat to civil liberties.” Some 17 percent thought so in 2022, up from 12 percent in 2021. They conclude: “A nontrivial percentage of Americans feel that the intelligence community is an insidious threat instead of a valuable protector in a dangerous world – a perspective that jeopardizes the security and prosperity of the United States and its allies.” 

The word “insidious” was nowhere in the poll’s question. The question forced respondents to pick one choice, ranging from appreciating the “vital role” of the intelligence community in national security, to seeing it as a threat to Americans’ civil liberties. One can believe, as we do, that the United States and its allies need the protection of U.S. intelligence in a dangerous world growing more dangerous, while also believing that some elements of the intelligence community – the FBI being the primary bad actor – are, indeed, running roughshod over Americans’ civil liberties. These are not mutually exclusive descriptions.

The Imperative of Listening to Concerns from the Left and Right

This misperception shows how the intelligence community, which listens for a living, would do well to absorb the concerns of well-informed critics.

In the run up to this year’s Section 702 debate, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and other leaders of the intelligence community met with us, as well as other civil liberties groups, from the left-leaning American Civil Liberties Union to the right-leaning Americans for Prosperity. These invitations were appreciated. Surveillance reformers came away well briefed about the concerns of the intelligence community, but none of us felt that our substantive concerns were taken to heart. Perhaps it is time for a longer, and more in-depth dialogue, one that could also include Members of Congress and key staff,  advancing the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence by removing the contentious issues of civil liberties violations.

We keenly wish intelligence community leaders to understand that such issues are real and painful. This is important to know because when one of the 18 intelligence agencies, or bad actors within those agencies, misuses the immense surveillance capabilities they’ve been entrusted with, it degrades and threatens the vital mission of U.S. intelligence – as the UT poll suggests.

For example, five years after the fact, it has yet to sink in just how awful and dangerous the FBI’s behavior was in 2016-17. Many on Capitol Hill – including some who are deeply critical of Donald Trump – remain dismayed by the tactics used against Trump campaign associates.

If this sounds like a right-wing talking point, you may not have absorbed the facts in DOJ Inspector General Michael Horowitz’s report on “Crossfire Hurricane.” Horowitz reported “17 significant ‘errors or omissions’ and 51 wrong or unsupported factual assertions in the applications to surveil [Trump aide Carter] Page.” The FBI’s actions misinformed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) into issuing four surveillance orders, one can reasonably say essentially against a presidential campaign and then against a new administration, by portraying as invaluable intelligence a document it knew or should have known was a shoddy political opposition research paper. At least one DOJ official was marketing this “intelligence” with the media. And when the FISC wanted to know if Page was a CIA asset, an FBI lawyer provided a doctored document hiding that exonerating fact from the court (the lawyer later pleaded guilty).

Conservatives were also alarmed by the 2020 letter signed by a Who’s Who of recently retired intelligence officials that the Hunter Biden laptop story had the “classic earmarks of a Russian intelligence operation.” The letter cast doubt on the authenticity of the Biden “laptop” (the letter itself puts that in scare quotes) and provides a bottom-line conclusion: “our experience makes us deeply suspicious that the Russian government played a significant role in this case.” Hunter Biden has since admitted the laptop was his, and the Justice Department just prosecuted him successfully based on some of the correspondence captured on that laptop. Based on what is currently known, their letter should have at a minimum been more highly caveated. 

Former intelligence officials have a right to speak on any topic. Warnings about Russian disinformation and attempts to control our politics are real – and Russian involvement with political uses of the laptop has not been disproven in this very case. But these recent officials cannot help but reflect badly on the U.S. intelligence agencies they so recently led when they draw conclusions based on incomplete information days before an election.  

The left also has its reasons for distrust. Progressives are concerned that non-violent protesters have been targeted for improper surveillance for simply exercising their First Amendment rights. Liberals voiced outrage when it was revealed that the Department of Defense warrantlessly purchased sensitive personal information on Americans from a Muslim dating app. People of all political persuasions are concerned that the FBI used Section 702 data to warrantlessly spy on political commentators, Members of the U.S. House and Senate, 19,000 donors to a Congressional campaign, journalists, and a state judge who had the temerity to report a local police chief’s civil rights violations to the FBI.

Such incidents are not internet conspiracies. They are established by information gleaned from mandated reporting and from the courts. For example, the FBI earned a rare rebuke – eventually made public – from the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Judge James E. Boasberg for “widespread violations” of the querying procedure of the Section 702 database against Americans. The FISC also revealed the FBI used warrantless NSA data for a wide range of purely domestic cases, though not explicitly contrary to then-existing policy. These cases include health-care fraud, bribery and other crimes posing no threat to national security.

How Use of Emerging Technology Exacerbates Mistrust

This leads to another realization we wish the intelligence community to absorb. There are now so many ways to warrantlessly surveil Americans that, for all practical purposes, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution might as well be a dishrag. Consider the routine practice by federal agencies ranging from the FBI to the IRS, DEA, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense of buying and warrantlessly accessing Americans’ digital data scraped from apps and sold to the government by shadowy, third-party data brokers.

The justification for this practice is that Americans waive away their rights to this data when they sign the terms and conditions of a given social media platform or an app. Americans accept these terms because they know companies only want this anonymized information to place ads in their digital feeds. Until recently, few were aware that their own government is purchasing personal information that is more intimate than a diary. Some people, after all, lie to their diaries or omit some details. But our digital trails reveal everything about us.

Federal agencies collect bankruptcy information, employment history and income, credit histories, consumer purchase histories, and consumer interests. They acquire records about our ethnicities, voting registration, travel records, and attorney-client information. They purchase information about our medical and mental health, religious activities, browsing histories, and library records, communications with friends, expressions of political views, our associates, and details about our sex lives. All of this data is easily de-anonymized and searchable by name.

The authors of a report released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence admitted that such data “could be used, for example, to identify every person who attended a protest or rally based on their smartphone location or ad-tracking records.” Such information could also be used, the report acknowledged, to “facilitate blackmail, stalking, harassment, and public shaming.” 

As more Americans learn about this practice, they are understandably alarmed. Eighty percent of Americans in a recent YouGov poll say Congress should require government agencies to obtain a warrant before purchasing location information, internet records, and other sensitive data about people in the U.S. from data brokers. Yet these data purchases continue apace, and without any judicial oversight.

Shortly after the House of Representatives passed the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, 219-199, to require warrants before the government can purchase Americans’ data, Director Haines issued a directive requiring agencies to formulate internal guidelines and reporting requirements on commercially acquired data. This is a welcome development. An associated report acknowledges that such data can be de-anonymized – that is, it can reveal information specific to individual Americans who’ve done nothing to justify having their entire lives X-rayed.

Data purchasing is just one example of why the Fourth Amendment is increasingly a dead letter. Add to this an 11th hour amendment to Section 702 that expands the definition of an electronic service provider to include almost every business with access to “communications equipment.” Such a broad definition could force employees and even custodial workers to insert thumb-drives to sweep Americans’ data, under compulsion and lifetime gag orders. At this writing, Congress is considering  narrowing the definition of entities that must comply with government surveillance orders – but chooses to do so with secret legislation, preventing the rest of Congress and the American people from knowing the boundaries of this change. And the House Intelligence Committee so far is refusing even to allow this modification.

At the local level, private and public cameras are being linked to create comprehensive surveillance networks. Federal grants are proliferating cell-site simulators, often called Stingrays, that ping cellphones for location tracking and sometimes extraction of content from cellphones across a wide area. These are useful investigative tools. Many murderers, robbers, and rapists have been successfully prosecuted by evidence from surveillance cameras and Stingrays. The danger is that the networking of all these tools, with comprehensive data scraping from social media and apps, will be combined with ubiquitous facial recognition software and AI to create a Chinese-style Panopticon, in which everyone can be directly monitored by the government without being directly aware of it.

And, of course, when all else fails, the intelligence community can rely not on legislation but on Executive Order 12333. Sens. Ron Wyden and Martin Heinrich revealed that the CIA has engaged in collection of Americans’ data for years under 12333. The absence of statutory authority for such programs means they have no judicial oversight whatsoever.

What motivates U.S. intelligence to push for such capabilities? FBI Director Wray warns that China is targeting American infrastructure in a warlike way. Cyber attacks, election interference and other malign influence operations by adversarial foreign nations, new non-state terrorist threats, and other dangers have proliferated. In the UK, GCHQ Director Anne Keast-Butler reveals that Russia is not only preparing aggressive cyberattacks on Western targets but is also fomenting acts of physical sabotage. We understand that U.S. intelligence needs robust tools to track and counter such threats. But Americans left and right should fear the use of these awesome powers of surveillance to be targeted at a lawful protester, or to warrantlessly examine the personal communications of a U.S. senator or a judge.

Granted, most people in the intelligence community are dedicated and hard-working civil servants, and are assuredly not seeking to create a panopticon for political interference or harassment of people or organizations they don’t like. But a panopticon is coming – and is in many ways already here – as technology weaves together its elements. And when an American Panopticon is established, it is inevitable that bad apples and rogue agencies will use it for purposes at odds with our democracy. There is nothing hackneyed about calling such threats “Orwellian.”

Two years before the next round of debate over Section 702, an earlier, deeper, and more wide-ranging conversation needs to take place between the intelligence and civil liberties communities. It is in the best interests of U.S. intelligence and its mission to keep Americans safe from escalating foreign threats that we discuss ways to ensure that powerful technologies and programs come within some recognizable version of the American constitutional system. Congressional passage of measures like the Section 702 warrant requirement and the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act would be a good first step.

Myth vs. Fact Quiz

The Intelligence Community is made up of the FBI, CIA, and NSA.

Myth. Those agencies are part of the Intelligence Community but it’s bigger than just those three. The IC includes 17 separate government elements that collect and analyze intelligence in order to better protect our nation and our people.

All intelligence agencies do more or less the same thing.

Myth. Intelligence Community agencies help protect our country through their work in different fields, from satellites to military intelligence to illegal drug trafficking to counterterrorism investigations, to name a few. That requires agencies with parallel and complementary expertise. IC agencies also serve very different customers with different needs, including policy-makers, diplomats, warfighters, and national leaders.

Intelligence Community employees can’t use social media…ever.

Myth. Actually, most Intelligence Community (IC) employees can use social media. Each agency sets guidelines to protect its people and its work, but there can be plenty of friending and following and liking in your future, even for the ~1.4 million folks (at last count) with a Top Secret clearance (working in that secure, undisclosed location you’ve heard so much about). (The total number of people holding a clearance of any type at last count was approximately 4.25 million.) In fact, you could say that IC employees are members of one of the world’s most exclusive social networks!  

Passing the security clearance background check is do-able as long as you haven’t done anything illegal.

Fact. Security clearance candidates must meet specific qualifications, such as being a law-abiding U.S. citizen, but a few parking tickets won’t disqualify someone from a career in the Intelligence Community. The background check ensures that only the most qualified and committed candidates are selected, based on a thorough and stringent application process. Some kinds of legal trouble can preclude you from service in the IC, but even more important is to be candid about issues during the clearance process.

You must be able to speak multiple languages to work in the Intelligence Community.

Myth. Nein, non, no. Operatives in movies are often seen speaking fluent Farsi or Mandarin to do their jobs, but it’s not a requirement to be hired in the Intelligence Community. That said, knowing one or more foreign languages is a great asset. In fact, intelligence agencies often teach employees foreign languages needed to perform their jobs.

People that work for intelligence agencies use high-tech gear all the time.

Myth. Spy movies like to show off all kinds of outlandish gadgets, but real intelligence officers seldom use them. An analyst wouldn’t necessarily need a wristwatch with a built-in buzz saw to write a report, though admittedly that would be cool. That said, our scientists and engineers do get to work on and with some pretty cool advanced technology. While we can neither confirm or deny sharks with frickin’ lasers, you can check out Charlie, CIA’s robot catfish, the high-tech research projects currently underway at IARPA, or what NGA’s Research directorate is doing to advance innovation.

All Intelligence Community officers in the field have martial arts skills and special weapons training, which they use often.

Myth. Sorry to disappoint, but Jason Bourne and Sydney Bristow are not realistic portrayals of intelligence work. Most IC employees aren’t what you think of as “field agents,” and even those who do collect human intelligence (HUMINT) don’t engage in hand-to-hand combat or bloody shoot-outs to get that information. IC employees in security protective roles do receive weapons and defense skills training, however, the majority of IC officers are focused on building relationships and collecting information using solid tradecraft, not theatrics.

The government is hiding aliens in Area 51.

Myth. Area 51, aka Homey Airport and Groom Lake, is a classified remote location of Edwards Air Force Base in southern Nevada—NOT a landing base for aliens and extraterrestrial meteorites. Though the base’s current operations are not disclosed to the public, in the past the area has been used for classified aeronautic technology development and flight test and training exercises. The truth about UFOs might be out there, but don’t look for it at Area 51. Don’t believe us? Read about the CIA’s brush with real-life “X-files.”

The Constraints and Obstacles Facing U.S. Intelligence

In the mid-1970s, there were two congressional investigations that grew out of Watergate, essentially the Church committee in the Senate and the Pike committee in the House. Those two committees recommended an elaborate series of laws and regulations to oversee the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities. President Ford signed an executive order that regulated U.S. intelligence activities. Then two permanent committees, one in the House and one in the Senate, were created to oversee the U.S. intelligence community. The result of all of that is that an elaborate, extensive and complex web of laws, executive orders and regulations, governs the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities. No comparable law governs the regulation of U.S. military activity. The only thing that comes anywhere close is the War Powers Resolution, also passed in that same era, which is widely ignored. …

So you have the irony of a stack of regulations that must be this high, governing secret intelligence activities, with lots of people in Congress informed about it. And the comparable regulations governing the movement of U.S. forces and the conduct of U.S. military operations is tiny.

The sad fact of the matter is it keeps a lot of lawyers busy. The good news is that, over time, we have figured out ways to conduct necessary intelligence activities and comply with the law, but still largely do what needs to be done. But it clearly “gums up the works” as we try to put together intelligence activity. It risks disclosures, because every time additional people know about activities, there is a greater risk of leaks. But we have largely found a way to make it work.

Recently, there’ve been comments that the reason we didn’t know about September 11 is because of these bureaucratic requirements–the ban on assassinations which came out of the Church committee hearings, and this bureaucracy that’s been created, if you will–that make people in the field risk averse. True?

I don’t know the answer to that. I think it is a fair and good question to ask. As former President Bush has said, we ought to look at all of those rules and regulations to determine if we have it right. I’m not certain, in my own mind, that these rules and regulations really inhibited our ability either to penetrate the terrorist organizations, or to find out what was coming. It’s an enormously difficult intelligence task; made, no doubt, somewhat more difficult by these rules. But I’m not persuaded that they necessarily led to the failure….

In your experience–because you start with the Cold War–[as] we come to the present, to modern-day terrorism in the post-Soviet era, has it been really a breakdown not so much of intelligence, but of cultural understanding of what we’re dealing with?

Well, in many respects it was much easier to deal with the Soviet Union. We successfully managed a balance of nuclear terror with the Soviets for 50 years, nearly, and we didn’t blow one another up. And that’s a huge achievement, candidly.

Dealing with these groups is much, much more difficult. They are, as often said, para-statal; they’re not a government; they’re not a state; but they have many of the attributes of a state. They’re big, they’re well financed, they’re secretive, they operate outside of ordinary established legal channels. They enjoy support across a number of governments. Very, very difficult to deal with.

We don’t have formal relations with them like we did with the Soviet Union. We don’t have a series of back channels with them like we did with the Soviet Union, and they don’t behave in a responsible fashion like, at the end of the day, the Soviets did, with respect to managing their nuclear weapons. It’s a fundamentally different situation and we’re going to have to look at the way we conduct our business, at the way we confront it, and at the way we fight it.

The FBI has told us that they have had a problem over the last decade because there are almost no Arab-speaking FBI agents, and they’ve had to build up their capacity.

That’s accurate. … Despite oversight committee recommendations of all the appropriate committees and the appropriators and everybody else, we have not been able to get the administration to listen to, in the past decade, the need to invest in those capabilities; to diversify law enforcement agency and intelligence agencies; and train sufficiently to get the job done that needs to be done. …

I recall back in the Aspin-Brown report as it came out, one of the main findings we made after investigating the roles and capabilities of our intelligence community back in the early 1990s was that we did not have the right mix of skills. … There’s not enough money to train people to speak the languages. There are not enough officers out there to recruit agents who speak the languages. There are not enough agents out there who speak the languages who are sympathetic to the United States of America and what it stands for. …

What would the benefit be from having agents who actually steeped in the language, in the culture and are… What could they do for us in the future?

… They have the contacts. They know the culture. They know the places to go. They know the nerve centers. They can go to the right coffee shop at the right time and hear the right minister’s aide talking to the other minister’s aide and get the right information. You could study that target forever and not know that, unless you knew the local scene.

Those people are invaluable. We have fewer and fewer of them. And the tragedy is we have not brought along the next generation of them. We’re going to have a generational gap of these people. We’ve lost them in droves in retirements. We’ve lost some, tragically, in casualties. …

There are not enough people to examine all the information. We are inundated with tidbits of information. Finding in these ever-growing haystacks the nuggets, the needles that we need, has become increasingly difficult, because the haystacks have taken on a culture of their own now. …

We’ve got wonderful sensors. … That’s glamorous, in-place sensors. That’s fun stuff. But when it talks about going through reams and reams and reams and reams of take, and say, “Does any of this stuff mean anything?” especially if it’s in a foreign language or in code or in some other thing, that’s very hard to deal with. That’s hard work, and it takes a very dedicated person with a great deal of concentration to do that job well, and a huge amount of knowledge. And those people are hugely valuable, and they are probably under-rewarded in the system.

And hard to come by.

Very hard to come by.

We’ve been told that in 1998 DEA agents in Pakistan had developed their own network of informants into Afghanistan. Of course, the Nairobi bombing had taken place. And they had discovered that Osama bin Laden has a kidney problem, is on dialysis, that his doctor was in Peshawar, and that they had the ability, possibly, to poison his dialysis treatment, but that their proposal to do so was rejected when it was sent through the embassy to CIA, because of the ban on assassinations.

This is the first time I’ve heard that story. I have no idea whether it’s true or not. But if your question is should we rescind the ban on assassinations, my view is, no. In my view, Americans are not assassins. And we have been able to conduct necessary military and intelligence activities, including covert intelligence activities involving the use of lethal force to combat and disrupt terrorist activities outside the United States, and, in some instances, the activities of drug dealers outside the United States, without engaging in assassinations.

But…when you were in the CIA, as general counsel, we were, in a sense, at peace. Now, for all intents and purposes, we’re at war. Shouldn’t we be taking the gloves off?

Even in war, there are rules. We don’t shoot prisoners. There’s a whole body of law that governs the conduct of armed hostilities, and the reason is because how you fight a war does matter, because there will come an end to the war. We’ll have to move on with life, and you don’t necessarily throw out all of the rules just because you are at war. The ban on assassinations, which is a presidential executive order, initially signed by President Ford, but, in essence, was repeated and endorsed by all presidents to date… There is something about crossing that line that Americans have been unwilling to do. It raises moral questions: Is this the sort of country we are, that we target a foreign leader for murder? And it also raises questions of, is it effective? Does it truly deter or disrupt terrorist activities?

I don’t think you need to back it. I think that the use of lethal force as a last resort in situations where you’re trying to bring well-known criminals to justice is a concept most Americans are fairly comfortable with. It doesn’t exactly go back to the “Wanted, Dead or Alive” poster. But the idea is, if you’ve got a criminal, and you’ve gone through the proper identification process, as you’re trying to bring that person to justice, the person resists and tries to take a shot at our law enforcement people or our operatives in the field, I think that the possibility of lethal force is well understood. …

Let me just make sure I understand. You don’t believe we need to change the presidential directive on assassinations?

I don’t think it’s necessary, because I think it is very important that we expand the number of arrows we have in the quiver of what I will call covert action, and I don’t mean covert action, capital C, capital A. I just mean action that is not visible, where our hand doesn’t show, or where you don’t necessarily know where it’s coming from, but it changes the course of events.

It might be psychological warfare. It might be something going on in some circles, that change of financial outcome somewhere to the disadvantage of a terrorist. Things like that need to be expanded. We do not have a big enough bag of tricks to work with. But the assassination piece, the lethality question… We are a civilized nation. I don’t think we are setting out where the idea is the way to deal with this is to go assassinate somebody. I think what we would start out with is we are going to catch that person and bring them to justice. And I think that is the way to look at this.

So no poison cigars for Castro? That’s still out. No hit man like the Israelis might send to take out some leader of a Palestinian group?

I think in our system of government, there is a possibility of doing those kinds of things under extreme last resort circumstances with the appropriate oversight.

So that would change the presidential directive.

I don’t think it would change the presidential directive, if you read it closely. My view is the president has the right to do that, but not an unfettered right to do that.

In 1995, when I became general counsel of the CIA, there were a series of investigations about CIA activity, largely in Central and South America. There were a series of allegations in public that were being investigated by the Congress and by the…CIA inspector general–that CIA officers overseas had recruited and were paying people as sources of information who were serious human rights abusers, and, in one case, were paying an individual who was responsible for the death of an American citizen. That allegation later turned out not to be true, by the way.

But, nevertheless, the agency was under huge pressure from the Congress and from the press about, how could you deal with these horrible people? And so it occurred to us that the CIA had no guidelines for dealing with sources of intelligence information who had serious criminal or human rights problems. The DEA and the FBI have had such guidelines forever. So I suggested, and Director of Central Intelligence Deutsche agreed, and the operations directorate agreed, that it would be a good idea to have guidelines patterned after those used by the FBI in their dealings, for example, with a source inside the Mafia.

So we put those guidelines in place. Essentially, they require that if the CIA wishes to recruit a source of human intelligence information, that is to say, a human being, outside the United States with a bad record, that is to say, someone who’s committed murders, someone who’s a drug dealer, someone who’s a terrorist–these are terrible people. On the other hand, they’re the only ones that are going get us inside these terrorist organizations.

[The guidelines require] that when we’re going to recruit somebody like that, the CIA headquarters ought to know about that, and they ought to be given the opportunity to balance the value of the intelligence that we’re going to gain by having a relationship with this person against the risks to the United States that accrue from dealing with him or her.

You mean they would just recruit people in the past and not inform headquarters to what they were like or who they were?

There was information that went to headquarters about a recruitment; but in our judgment, it was inadequate. So we simply added to the amount of information that had to be provided to headquarters before a recruiting attempt was made, and at the time everybody thought that was a good idea.

What about dealing with people who kill American citizens and commit mass murder or human rights violations in their own country; can we recruit them as agents?

The guidelines for agent recruitment are an area of great debate, and the consequence of the dampening effect on [risk-taking] of some of our people, has been unmistakable. I mean we have lost something since 1995.

What is it? What did we lose?

What I am suggesting is that the concern about the political backlash of having a flap in a foreign country, especially involving a human rights violator, is so great that it isn’t worth [it to] our operatives out there. It isn’t just a question of them being denied the opportunity to go do that. It’s just the smart people out there say, “This isn’t worth going at the target this way. I’ll try and go at it another way.” That’s what’s happened.

Has there been any intelligence failure because of that?

I would say yes. But … how do you know what you don’t know? …

But have any of these restrictions impeded their ability to gather information?

In their view, yes. And that’s the point. But if you go to the headquarters personnel here and talk to the top brass, they say, “No, because we give waivers. If they come in with a legitimate case, we’ll give them a waiver.” And I think they’ve said, “We’ve never turned them down.” So there’s a miscommunication going on here. …

The whole issue is, at what level do you get approval to do that? That’s essentially been the discussion. Can you get this approval in the field any more? No, you have to come home. You have to come to headquarters. Does headquarters want to… be put in a position where they have to make these tough judgment calls? Not really. Therefore, if you’re smart in the field, you don’t send a hard decision back to headquarters. …

We heard from Congressman Goss and from former Senator Rudman that their experience in the field is that agents in the field today feel risk-averse, if you will, because of these regulations, and this added bureaucratic paperwork that they have to go through.

I understand that concern. And if that is the case, it needs to be fixed. I think the guidelines ought to be reevaluated. CIA management ought to look at them, and if they are having this effect, then they need to be modified, accordingly. Let me hasten to add, however, that George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, the other senior leadership of the CIA, do not agree with that assessment. In their view, and in my experience, the guidelines never led to the CIA at Washington being unwilling to approve the recruitment of a human source with serious human rights or criminal problems when that individual could provide valuable intelligence. … It needs to be made very clear to officers in the field that we expect them to take risks, and we’re going to back them up when they take those risks. If that’s not happening–and I must say I’m disappointed to learn that some officers in the field believe that–but if it is happening, that needs to be fixed. …

OK. So the question is, is it true, as some people are alleging, that the Central Intelligence Agency or international covert operators can’t go near “bad guys” that we need in order to accomplish something?

That is not true. We have, in the past, in instances in which I am personally aware, dealt with individuals who have engaged in terrible acts, some of which were designed to kill Americans. We have dealt with those individuals. We have paid them for the acquisition of intelligence information from them. The information we have obtained from those individuals has proved extraordinarily valuable to the United States in disrupting activities, in bringing people to justice, when necessary. It is not accurate to say that we have been unable to do it. …

But you must also understand that when we deal with these people, when we pay them money, when we meet with them, when we become part of their lives, which is what happened, the United States is inevitably drawn in to the activities of that individual, and what they’re doing, and what that group is doing. And one has to do that with your eyes open, and not become in any way a part of that activity. That’s a challenge–to get the intelligence but not be tainted in some fashion by dealing with some people that are embodiments of evil. …

We’ve learned that the CIA doesn’t like to tell the FBI things, sometimes for rivalry reasons, or personality conflicts, sometimes because they don’t want to give up, quote, “their sources.” The INS doesn’t have an efficient system, many times, to tell the FBI or the CIA that the person they’re looking for is already in the country…. There’s a culture of distrust, of bureaucratic procedures that are different, laws that are in conflict with each other. It’s almost like we have Keystone Kops running around, who may [in the end, when we study this,] have been able to put together September 11. But because of the culture or customs, the laws of America, it didn’t happen.

I strongly suspect that when we look back at what happened, we will find that there are nuggets of information scattered around various U.S. agencies, perhaps information in the hands of foreign intelligence services, that had we been able to pull it together, would have given us warning. That is a very serious issue that needs to be examined. You are correct. A variety of U.S. agencies, intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, do not share information….

They’re not even on the same computers….They can’t even talk to each other.

That is a very serious problem. I mentioned earlier how long it has taken the military to learn to act jointly. The U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community needs to go through that same exercise. They need to look at the laws that constrain their activity or that govern their activity. We need to find a way that still protects the rights of defendants in criminal trials but permits that information to be shared with the intelligence community. The intelligence community needs to be prepared to share its information with the law enforcement community. …

It’s going to be very hard to do, because these procedures have grown up over years; they have good reasons, in some instances, reasons that are based in the law. But that ought to be changed. We now are facing a much more difficult challenge in finding terrorists, in building international coalitions, in rooting them out, and we can’t approach this through the rules and regulations of the past. …

The FBI and the CIA had problems over the years. This inter-bureaucratic rivalry and inability to communicate–does that account for some of this?

I think there’s no doubt that, over the years, going back to when the CIA was first started, that there was a rivalry and not the greatest communication between the two agencies. Back in the mid-1990s, under Louis Freeh’s regime and George Tenet’s regime started by John Deutch, they did a lot to get that gap closer together. … A better relationship exists, including exchange of personnel, more exchange of information, working together. And that was a great step in putting information together that has prevented several incidents from occurring, or putting a better intelligence package together for the people who make decisions.

But it wasn’t good enough; or it’s not good enough yet.

Well, no, everything could always be improved. And one of the ways it could be improved is they both need additional resources. They need to be sitting, a lot of times, closer together. They exchange personnel, but I’m saying that there needs to be a better harmony. There are other agencies that are out there also, that are involved in intelligence gathering. Sometimes they haven’t been the greatest in getting that information to either one of those two agencies.

I think that, under certainly Louis Freeh and George Tenet, the cooperation between the CIA and the FBI has vastly improved. And I think certainly when you get information that would indicate a terrorist act from the standpoint of the loss of life, that there is no doubt in my mind that the agencies would do everything in their power to prevent that.

The argument, though, becomes between how we divulge techniques. In other words, the divulgence of sources and techniques of investigation oftentimes become a center of issue between the agencies. But when information is developed that indicates that there will be a terrorist act, a violent act — and I’ve seen this in numerous occasions — agencies work very well to prevent it.

No one is questioning that the agencies would work in the right direction. But Nairobi is a good example; there was information that something was going on. There was a preventative raid, if you will, to disrupt the cell. The bombing still took place. They did what they set out to do.

They did exactly what they set out to do. But I also would submit — and again, I am not attempting to defend whether or not the flow of information is where it needs to be, and that the cooperation is exactly all that it needs to be — but the issue becomes how we manage that information and interpret that information. There’s been a jihad against this country for a number of years, in which the extremists in some of the Al Qaeda groups have avowed a violent reaction to the United States, and have demonstrated that on numerous occasions. That threat continues to exist. It existed prior to September 11. The only thing that was lacking, in terms of information, was really the specific target of that jihad. …

… Prior to 1978, the law was that the president, on his own, could authorize the interception of electronic communications in the United States for national security purposes without a warrant.

That is to say, the president could order the wiretap of an American citizen if he thought that this person was operating on behalf of a foreign power, was a spy. We could also target foreign installations in the United States, that is to say, embassies, and so on, without a warrant. But in the mid-1970s, the courts began to raise questions about the constitutionality of that. So in 1978, the Congress passed a statute called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act–often called FISA for short–that required that a warrant be obtained from a special court that sits to hear applications from the government to conduct these wiretaps within the United States.

This is like a secret court inside the Justice Department building?

That isn’t the way I would characterize it. These are sitting federal judges who ordinarily hear cases, routine cases, in federal court. They are designated by the chief justice of the United States to sit on this special court and hear these applications for wiretap warrants. … And when necessary, they go to the Department of Justice, to a secure room, where they are presented with the facts that the Justice Department, the FBI, the CIA, NSA, has marshaled, to meet the standard: is there reasonable cause to believe that this person is an agent of a foreign power? And if the U.S. government can prove that to the judge, the judge signs an order, which authorizes the wiretap.

And not just a foreign power, but also a possible terrorist?

That’s right. It does cover terrorists; yes.

Now we understand that there have been occasions, some recent occasions actually, where there’s a conflict between the use of these intelligence eavesdropping warrants, and what may in fact be a criminal case. So the result has been that this bureaucratic, or, if you will, legal conflict has resulted in people deciding, “Well, I guess we just won’t “bug” these people, or won’t do this wiretap.” … Do you remember anything like that happening during your tenure?

These are questions that arise from time to time, yes.

Which questions?

The question of, is this particular investigation that the United States is conducting a law enforcement investigation that’s going to lead to a trial? Or is it an intelligence investigation designed to produce intelligence which might lead to some other action, a military action, a diplomatic response, or an arrest overseas, or intelligence activities to disrupt it?

And the law now is such that, when you start down one course, it’s very hard, if not impossible, to shift to the other course, because the Title 3 wiretaps are developed and in place for criminal prosecutions–the Mafia, drug investigations, and so on–and that’s designed with a very specific set of rules governing the manner in which wiretaps will be conducted, ultimately, to be introduced in court, designed to protect the rights of the defendant. With an intelligence wiretap, it’s very different. The fundamental purpose is to collect as much information as you can–largely about non-Americans, but occasionally about Americans–and there’s never the intention that it will be used in prosecutions. The same issue sometimes arises in counterintelligence investigations–trying to find spies in the United States. Are you doing this for the purpose of finding out what they’re up to and perhaps expelling them, because you can’t try them if they have diplomatic protection? Or are you trying to find out who the American spy is so that you can prosecute them? A very elaborate set of rules and regulations have grown up under each of those two statutes. I think they need to be reconciled….

I don’t know exactly what the right answer is. But it seems to me that we need to find a way to have these wiretaps conducted in such a way that the maximum amount of information is obtained for intelligence purposes–and keep in mind that it’s called the “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act”–but at the same time, if necessary, have that information available for use in trial. We’re going to have to look at the rules of evidence. We’re going to have to look at the legal standards under which these are conducted in the first place, so that adequate protection is still afforded to American citizens under the Fourth Amendment. That cannot change.

But in terms of the manner in which the information is collected, disseminated, and handled, that needs to change. There are also instances in which the FBI and the Department of Justice will do a Title 3 wiretap–that’s a criminal wiretap–for counterterrorist purposes, because they intend to prosecute somebody, or they’re pursuing a counterintelligence investigation, and they refuse to share that information with the CIA. I think that has to change.

Or they’re in a grand jury and they’re legally…prohibited.

The same–yes; precisely right. The same issue arises under the grand jury rules, which prohibit the Department of Justice from giving grand jury information to the intelligence community. There are, as we speak, a series of proposals in Congress to change these rules, both for FISA wiretaps and for grand jury information, and my hope is that those rules will be changed.

So when we interviewed the recently retired head of the FBI in New York, Lew Schiliro, who led many of the terrorism investigations of the bin Laden organization, and he says to us, “Oh, that’s not a real problem. We, the FBI, figure that out with people, usually to everyone’s satisfaction.” You don’t agree?

I do not agree with that. The FBI and the Justice Department understand that the intelligence community needs to have access to that information. But they’ve been reluctant, and indeed feel prohibited under the existing law from giving the intelligence community access to that. They will say, “Tell us what you’re interested in and we’ll see if there’s a way we can tell you whether there’s anything we know that you might want to know. But it’s entirely up to us.” And that’s not a satisfactory way to do intelligence.

In cases when, let’s say, you’re listening to an intelligence case and it becomes a criminal case, you start hearing criminal evidence. Is there a problem in the FBI or in the Justice Department dealing with that crossover between the two?

Yes, there is. As I said, in the criminal world, everything goes through the district court, and you’re geared towards making your case in court–gathering the evidence and presenting it in court to get a prosecution. In a national security case, we’re basically concerned with the national security of the country. There’s not really an intent at the beginning of that case to take that case to court. [The intent is] trying to protect the national security of the nation, to find out, is somebody trying to overthrow the government? Is somebody trying to do whatever it takes to ruin the national security of the country? …

On a national security case…one reason why they don’t like to bring these cases to court is you have to divulge sources and methods. And a lot of times, the government does not like to divulge what sources and methods the government has used to obtain the information that is now being presented.

A CIA officer told the New York Times, “You never stop all the attacks, because you never hear about all of them. You just can’t spy on all of these groups. You have to destroy them, and that’s not what the CIA has been set up to do.”

That’s true.

Do we need a James Bond agency that goes out and basically whacks people?

No, we don’t. We don’t need that. … We have been trying to redefine our defense capabilities to respond to the kinds of threats we have today, and we’re trying to do the same exact thing with intelligence, change the capabilities we have. Do we need more arrows in the quiver of small “c,” covert action? The answer is yes. There is no doubt about that. Is it a James Bond assassination squad? Certainly not. It’s a great movie, but movies, unfortunately, are not reality.

Back in the day when James Bond was popular, that was sort of the image of intelligence. Those were, in many ways, the heydays. … Now we’re in the position where we have had to overcome this sort of bad period where intelligence is not only unfashionable, it’s un-American, and we don’t want to do that any more. We’ve had to resist that, rebuild the financing for it, rebuild the recruiting, rebuild the morale. It has been a very hard problem, and we are caught a little short, and that’s one of the reasons.

So when you say, “Was this a cultural problem that we had?” The answer is partly yes, because we decided that the world didn’t need quite as much intelligence, and we weren’t sure what it exactly it should be. So we backed off from some stuff. I can’t say we would have prevented the tragedies of last Tuesday if we’d had more intelligence. I’d just say the odds were higher that we could have.

So when I hear from people in the Central Intelligence Agency that I know, and some people who have gone public on this, that it’s the Church committee, it’s regulations like this, it’s the prohibition on assassinations, that’s why we can’t do our job, that’s why we didn’t know about September 11…

I don’t necessarily agree with that. …We don’t know the reason why we don’t know that this was going to occur. We need to look at what went wrong. Why didn’t we know about this terrible attack? And we need to try to identify those problems and fix them. Former President Bush has said we need to look at these rules and regulations, and if they have unnecessarily restricted our ability to collect and disseminate intelligence, then they need to be changed. I agree with that.

It is premature to conclude, simply because there are a lot of rules passed by Congress, by the way, signed by a number of presidents of both parties going all the way back to President Ford… I think it is wrong to conclude in a simplistic fashion that these rules and regulations, which have been designed to constrain the activities of an intelligence agency in a democracy… I think it’s a mistake to immediately conclude that those rules need to be thrown out just because of this one terrible intelligence failure.

… So what should we do?

Two things, in my judgment. First of all, with respect to some of these specific rules and regulations, Congress right now is proposing to enact legislation to move the line; that is to say, to make it easier…. For example, in terms of using wiretaps to collect information, Congress is proposing to move the line, to make it easier to collect information under one wiretap, under Title 3 criminal wiretap, and make it available to the intelligence community for foreign intelligence purposes. I think that’s appropriate. Congress has directed George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, to look at and rescind these regulations that require headquarters approval to recruit someone with serious human rights problems.

All of those things are appropriate to do in my view. We need to look at these rules and regulations and make appropriate adjustments. My point is we shouldn’t throw everything out; these were put in place for good and valid reasons at the time. They have worked to protect the rights of American citizens, because we are still worried about an overreaching national security and law enforcement apparatus. And we’re still worried about protecting American rights under the Fourth Amendment. We can move too quickly; we can move the line too far in the wrong direction, and find that we are abusing the rights of Americans in order to enforce a law overseas. …

Do I hear you correctly, as a 30-year veteran of the intelligence community–either in it, or outside of it, or advising it–that despite the horror of September 11, we still have to have rules? We still have to make sure that we don’t turn into what we’re trying to destroy?

Yes. We cannot abuse the rule of law in seeking to enforce the rule of international law or our own domestic law. There will come a time when we will win this war, and how we fought it and how we won it matters. We are a nation held together by a belief in the Constitution, held together by the rule of law. We are not bound together by ethnic nor religious reasons. We believe in the Constitution. That is what makes this country great. It’s terribly important that we not lose sight of that in the course of fighting this war. We may need to adjust the lines; we may need to make some changes in the way we govern U.S. intelligence activities, law enforcement activities, and the way we conduct them. We need to be brutally tough. We need to be, when necessary, vicious. We need to use force and violence to achieve this objective. But that can still be done consistently with the rules of law in this country and the rule of law in armed conflict.

Resources

-intelligence.gov, “How The Ic Works

The Intelligence Community is made up of 18 elements that each focus on a different aspect of our common mission.”;

-politico.com, “Opinion | We Already Have 18 Intelligence Agencies. We Still Need 1 More.” By Jonathan Panikoff;

-quora.com, “Why are there so many federal agencies, and how do they all work together?” By Joe Willmore;

-gao.gov, “Intelligence Community Management.”;

-deseret.com, “Eyes on the watchers: Understanding the nation’s intelligence community.” By Natalia Galicza;

-brennancenter.org, “The U.S. Intelligence Community is Bigger Than Ever, But is It Worth It?” By Mike German;

-justsecurity.org, “Time for U.S. Intelligence to Ask: How Did We Alienate so Many Americans?” By Bob Goodlatte and Gene Schaer;

-intelligence.gov, “Myth vs. Fact Quiz.”;

-pbs.org, “The Constraints and Obstacles Facing U.S. Intelligence.” By Jeffrey Smith;

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